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



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[illegible] THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY VOTED TO KEEP THE MONARCHY, SHAH [illegible] BAZARGAN WOULD BE INVITED TO RETURN TO IRAN. [illegible] WOULD BE FORMED, ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD [illegible] REFERENDUM.

6. THE NATIONAL FRONT HAD CONSIDERED OTHER FIGURES FOR THE COUNCIL, INCLUDING GENERAL BOZAM, AMINI, SOBEYE, BUT THEY HAD NOT [illegible] OBJECTIONS. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE HAD BEEN [illegible].

7. THE NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ANTI-COMMUNIST, WOULD END MARTIAL LAW, RESTORE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, BUT PROBABLY NOT PERMIT PARTIES FOR ABOUT A YEAR. SAVAK WOULD LOSE ITS AUTONOMY. PROBABLY 10-15 SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS WOULD LEAVE THE SHAH. MOST OF THE PURGED OFFICERS WOULD BE RESTORED POSTS. THE OPPOSITION HAD DISCUSSED STRATEGY WITH MILITARY LEADERS WHICH COULD ASSURE THE LOYALTY OF THE ARMED [illegible] SERIOUS PROBLEM WAS ANTICIPATED. NUMBER OF OFFICERS HAD SPOKEN RECENTLY ON SHAHIAT--[illegible] AND SEPARATELY ON THE NATIONAL FRONT.

8. [illegible] ASKED WHAT THE U.S. SHOULD DO. BAZARGAN HAD TOLD THAT IF THE U.S. [illegible] IN SUPPORT FOR THE SHAH, HE [illegible] MILITARY OFFICERS [illegible] COUNTRY IMMEDIATELY. HOPED THE U.S. WOULD [illegible] OPPOSITION LEADERS TO [illegible] SHAH OR [illegible] AND SO AVOID DISRUPTION COULD BE AVOIDED.

9. [illegible] ASKED IF THE OPPOSITION HAD ANY PLANS [illegible] CONVEYED THE PLAN TO [illegible] BAZARGAN SAID THE [illegible] SAID ABOUT [illegible] BAHAVI (BROTHER OF PAHLAVI FINANCES), [illegible] OFFER PRIME MINISTERSHIP TO MEDI BAZARGAN. LATTER [illegible] REFUSED BUT HAD NOT, IN TURN, GIVEN FINAL [illegible] ANSWER.

10. VISITOR EMPHASIZED THAT A COALITION AGAINST THE SHAH REMAINING ON THE SCENE HAS NO BASIS IN TODAY'S IRAN. [illegible] U.S. SHOULD EXPLORE [illegible] UTILITIES, RECOGNIZING THAT IRAN SHOULD BE MORE [illegible] TOWARDS U.S. BECAUSE IRAN NEEDS U.S. [illegible] SERVICES AND TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOP ITS [illegible].

11. BEYOND PLAN FOR [illegible] OF [illegible] SAID HE WOULD REPORT TO [illegible] ASSESS WHAT BAZARGAN [illegible] LAMBRAKIS WOULD BE [illegible].



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
**TRANSMITTAL SLIP**

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DATE: 6/13/79

TO: Charlie Naas, DCM Tehran — For the Attention of

FROM: Henry Precht, Director NEA/IRN

| TO THE FOREIGN SERVICE | TO THE DEPARTMENT |
|---|---|
| ☐ For Transmittal to Addressee at the Discretion of Post | ☐ Dept. Information Only |
| ☐ Post Information Only | ☐ CERP Publications |
| ☐ Transmit to Foreign Office | ☐ Enclosure to Previous Airgram |
| ☐ Submit Report | ☐ Reply to Department Request |
| ☐ Reply to the Individual | |

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☐ Inform:

REFERENCE

ITEMS/REMARKS

For your information.

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NUMBER AND DRAFTING OFFICE

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FORM DS - 4 12-64 ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1973—725-341/417 3-1

SECRET

NEA: Ms. Saunders
Mr. Precht
sent 6/1/79
copy

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
May 29, 1979

MEMO FOR DAVID NEWSOM

SUBJECT: Meeting with Morteza Bazargan

Last week, Jonathan Roosevelt called and asked me to meet with Prime Minister Bazargan's nephew. He apparently met with Henry Precht when he was in town last December. My notes from the meeting are attached for your information.

My reaction to young Bazargan is that he is extremely naive, though well-meaning. He may have illusions of becoming an emissary of some sort between the PGOI and the USG. He has no experience (or apparently any real concept) of foreign policy, but he claims to see his uncle as often as twice a week.

I hope this will be useful to you. Zbig suggested that I brief you on the meeting but that the distribution be limited.

Gary Sick

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MEMO FOR THE RECORD

Meeting with Morteza Bazargan

May 25, 1979; 2:30-3:30 p.m. OEOB

Bazargan is an engineer (like his uncle). For many years he has been associated with an American engineer, William Bierschenk. They maintain communications on a fairly regular basis by telephone and telex on a professional basis and Bierschenk accompanied him on the visit, as did Jonathan Roosevelt.

He asked how we could help the Iranian Government deal with the internal threats they are experiencing in the west and south of the country. He again identified the problem areas as Mahabad (northwest near the Turkish-Iraqi border--Ayatollah Hosseini), Kurdistan (Afshar Qasemlu) and Khuzestan (southwest, oil fields--Ayatollah Khagani). He indicated they have proof of outside involvement consisting of shipments of money and arms coming across the border (presumably from Iraq) and that "things are very bad for us." He also claims that Generals Oveissi and Palizban are active in the Kermanshahan area, operating from the Iraqi side of the border. According to Bazargan, Palizban directs attacks on villages and travelers in the region, using forces of hundreds of fighters. He acknowledged that he had no evidence that Oveissi was physically present, though he claimed that Oveissi had made trips to the area on several occasions.

Sick assured him that he had checked carefully and could assure him that the United States was not involved in supporting or encouraging this activity in any way. We were prepared to cooperate with the Government of Iran in developing information about external support for internal subversion. We could perhaps be particularly helpful in providing information about Soviet activities in Afghanistan and along the northern Iranian border. However, if he believed that we could simply turn off the rebellious activities in Khuzestan, Kurdestan, etc., he was incorrect. The areas where we could be most helpful, e.g. support for the military, had been closed off. However, if the Government of Iran wanted to open a quiet exchange of information on this or other areas of concern, we would be prepared to be as cooperative as possible.

Bazargan appeared disappointed. He was clearly convinced that we were sponsoring the Kurdish and Khuzestan rebellions, and he was looking for more than an offer of information exchange. He acknowledged the offer of information about

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Soviet activities, but commented that they were "not particularly interested" in Soviet activities in Afghanistan. On the northern border, they would be interested primarily in tracking down agents the Soviets are using to run guns and money across the border. He showed no interest whatever in Soviet military activities across the border. He is absolutely convinced that the Soviets are not involved in the Kurdish, Khuzestan activities which were foremost on his mind.

Bazargan then asked if the U.S. Government had any complaints or suggestions to make. Sick replied that our primary concern was the security of Americans in Iran. We appreciated the steps which had been taken to provide security to the Embassy, but the continued anti-American statements did not make us feel more comfortable about our people there. Secondly, he should be aware of the enormous political problem created by the summary trials and executions. So long as these continue, it is going to be very difficult for us to make the kind of conciliatory gestures we would otherwise be prepared to do. Finally, our major objective is to develop a sound working relationship with Iran. We accept the revolution. We know the Shah is not coming back. We realize there is a legacy of past history which must be overcome. But we think that Iran-U.S. relations are too important to remain as they are today. Iran is important to us and we believe we have much to offer the new government. We both start from a basic opposition to Soviet encroachment, and we must build a new relationship starting from there. Bazargan jotted a few notes.

Bazargan apparently intends to talk to his uncle about officially recognizing him as an emissary of the Iranian Government. He was unclear about just what he had in mind, but it may have been an interest in establishing his credentials through a word from Bazargan.

SECRET



[redacted] PRIORITY

[redacted] (Security Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH # 12

BOROUMAND, Abdorrahman

FROM : Amconsulate, [redacted]

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

October 12, 1957
DATE

REF :

| For Dept. Use Only | ACTION | DEPT. |
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| | REC'D | INFO OTHER |

SUBJECT: POLITICAL: Opinions of an Isfahani Intellectual

Over a period of six months this reporter and other officers of the Consulate have become acquainted with Dr. Abdorrahman BOROUMAND, a member of a well-known and affluent Isfahani family. The Consulate feels that some of Dr. Boroumand's observations may be of value to the Department since he represents the thinking of many western-educated scions of good family who appear to be, increasingly restive over present conditions in Iran.

Dr. Boroumand is approximately 31 years old. He is married and has one child with another on its way. His wife is a member of the [redacted] family, one of the wealthiest in Isfahan. He attended local schools and the University of Tehran where he studied law. After receiving his license, he went to Switzerland where he enrolled in the University of Geneva, obtaining his Doctorate in International Law in 1956. His thesis was entitled "La Licite Constitutionelle de la Conclusion des Traites Instituant une Communaute Supranationale". Since his return to Iran he has concerned himself with the running of the extensive family estates in cooperation with four of his brothers. This responsibility was further increased with the sudden death of his father, Mohsend BOROUMAND, last Spring. However, with the return of a fifth brother from the United States where he was studying agriculture, Mr. Boroumand will now be able to leave Isfahan for Tehran to clerk in the law office of [redacted] prior to being recognized as a qualified lawyer. Both he and his wife speak good French; the latter accompanied her husband to Europe and is a poised, outgoing companion for her husband. They speak no English.

Mr. Boroumand's father was considered one of the more progressive landlords in the Isfahan area and the complex of four villages which the family owns has been held up as a model for other landlords. This reporter has made four trips to the villages which occupy a tract of approximately 6,000 square acres situated on the new asphalt road leading north to Tehran. He has been impressed with the organization of the villages and the attempt which has been made to ameliorate the conditions of the peasants. The latter appear to be cleaner and healthier than any that this reporter has seen and the rows of two-room houses, each with its garden and separate stables for livestock, are kept in good condition by their occupants. The estate boasts a well-built primary-school erected by the Boroumand family. Water is supplied by a huge qhanat which flows into a reservoir whence it is divided into four equal parts for distribution to the four villages which

Thomas J. Scotes
REPORTER

[redacted]

villages which were assigned by the father to each of his four oldest sons. He had planned to get two more villages on new lands which he had bought prior to his death. These he hoped to allot to his two youngest sons. Since his death, the brothers are continuing the plan. However, with the exception of the oldest brother, the sons have been or will be educated abroad. Whether they will be willing to stay in Isfahan and play the role of country squire remains to be seen. The fact that Mr. Bornmand wants to leave for Tehran as soon as he can may well be an indication of the thinking of the others once they get a taste of more sophisticated living. For example, the brother who has just returned from the States is very dissatisfied and wants to return to continue his studies which were interrupted by the death of his father. Thus, the vious feeling that their father's projects should be continued may weaken in the face of their own personal desires. Be that as it may, the Bornmand family will continue to be an important one in Isfahan. An uncle, Mohamad Taqay BORNMAND, is presently Mailis Deputy from Isfahan. Another close relative, Col. Amirteh BORNMAND, was recently Chief of Staff for the Commanding General of the 5th Infantry Brigade, while another relative, Col. Saifollah BORNMAND, is now in charge of the G-2 (Intelligence and Security) Section of the same Brigade.

The reporting officer feels that the opinions which Mr. Bornmand expressed in the memoranda of conversations under cover are indicative of much of the thinking of the so-called intellectual and liberal class which he has encountered during his tour in Isfahan. That most of this small but potentially influential group are dissatisfied with the present situation is known. However, the fact that many of them have begun to speak more frankly and earnestly with Consulate officers seems to indicate that they are beginning to despair that any changes can take place if the present regime further consolidates its power, and that as a result, they are trying to communicate with Americans in the hope that some way can be found to avert the radical solution which many of them fear will occur in the next few years if something is not done. The reasoning of these men may appear naive or unrealistic when, for example, they expound on the role of the British in their internal affairs, but in the opinion of this reporter, these people are sincere and should be heard. For as they say themselves, "this may not be the way we analyse the problem, but this is the way we do, and nothing in the present situation can disabuse us of our opinions".

This writer has known Mr. Bornmand for a short time and his family for a while longer. He does not consider him or his family a group of radicals. Rather they are a part of the wealthy upper class which should incline them to more conservative ideas than they now hold.

This reporter is in no position to state categorically that everything which Mr. Bornmand, and his family and friends have expressed in the various conversations we have had, reflects the thinking of everyone in this particular intellectual or liberal group. He does believe that they exemplify very well what type of people many of them are, what they think, and what they believe with great conviction. He is therefore of the opinion that further contact with Mr. Bornmand and Mr. [illegible] (the latter was introduced by Mr. Bornmand to Mr. Waltmann and the reporter) may be valuable in keeping the Department informed of the activities and the fate of a group that has

/hitherto been





hitherto been unwilling to reveal itself to the Consulate. It is significant, at least to this reporter, that of the various people that the Consulate contacted in the last few weeks concerning the wave of arrests of Iran Party and NFM members which are reportedly taking place in Tehran under an extreme cover of secrecy, only Mr. Bornmand and Mr. Vash were aware of them and able to give a rough estimate of the number of people involved.

The Consulate will keep the Department and the Embassy informed of future meetings with others whom Mr. Vash has indicated that he will introduce to the Consulate's officers, and who more than likely may be members or sympathizers of the Iran Party or of the National Resistance Movement.

Enclosed please find three memoranda of conversations which form the basis for the covering despatch. The conversations were carried on in Persian and French.

Enclosures
3 memoranda of conversation.

Franklin J. Crawford
American Consul.

*A like-minded friend of Mr. Bornmand; also an Isfahani.

CC: AmEmbassy, Tehran
Department please pass Khorramshahr, Tabriz, Meshed

Page_____of
Desp. No._____
From_____

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(Classification)

Page 1 of
Encl. No. 12
Desp. No.
From Consulate, Isfahan

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN MR. ARDESHIR BORUMAND AND HIS REPORTING OFFICER.

The following conversation between Mr. Borumand and the reporting officer took place during a visit to the Borumand estate by a party of Consulate officers and their wives.

Mr. Borumand asked whether it is true that Ambassador Chapin would soon be recalled. When informed that the Consulate had no news of any impending transfer, Borumand replied that Isfahan is full of rumors, and that it is difficult to believe anything. The reporter then asked if there is any truth to the rumor that members of the Iran Party and of the National Resistance Movement had recently been arrested in Isfahan. Borumand answered that he too had heard the same rumor, but that as far as he knew, it was not true. He added that he had heard that arrests have taken place in Tehran.

The conversation then developed into a general discussion of internal conditions in Iran. Borumand said that the situation is bad, and that there is no hope that it can get any better with the present regime in power. He said that the liberal elements in Iran are looking to the United States to bring some kind of pressure to bear on the present government to end the repression which holds Iran in its grip.

Iranians know the British and the Russians from past experience and cannot expect that they will be disinterested when it comes to Iran's internal conditions. The United States, on the other hand, covets nothing that Iran has, and for that reason, Iranians can trust her. However, if the United States continues to be associated with the present ruling class, it will lose the good feeling that it presently enjoys.

No thinking Iranian can object to Iran's present foreign policy. However, if more internal liberty is not granted, the people may become desperate and turn to radicals to solve their problems. This could very well affect Iran's international commitments.

Mossadeq was a true patriot, but went too fast in too short a time. He also alienated the Court, which is still a power to be reckoned with in Iran. However, the Shah may well lose his popular support if things do not get better.

He went on to say that Americans must get in contact with more liberal Iranians and give them support. He asked that the reporter introduce him to some of his friends at the Embassy so that he could maintain his contacts with Americans while in Tehran. In turn, if Embassy personnel wished to meet Iranians who feel as he does, he will be happy to arrange meetings.

The reporter mentioned to Mr. Borumand that any change in the status quo might possibly affect his family's financial and social position. Borumand /answered that



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Desp. No._____
From_____

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(Classification)

Page 2 of
Encl. No. 1
Desp. No. 12
From Consulate, Isfahan

answered that he realized this, but that as a true patriot, he must state the truth as it is.

He concluded by saying that the Shah should become a Constitutional Monarch and entrust the government to younger and more honest men. He said that members of the Iran Party and the National Resistance Movement are the true patriots who could and should govern Iran. They are not Communists, nor extremists. The present government wishes to continue as in the past, and this is slowly forcing the younger potential leaders to despair that anything can be changed save by a revolution.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN MR. ABDORRAHMAN BORUMAND, MR. JOSEPH SALTZMAN, CONSULATE POLITICAL OFFICER, AND THE REPORTING OFFICER

The following conversation took place at the Consulate on October 5, 1957 between Mr. Abdorrahman Borumand, Joseph Saltzman, Consulate Political Officer, and the reporting officer:

After the usual amenities, Mr. Borumand continued his previous discussion by saying that the Army could capture Dashsh if it really wanted, but foreign diplomacy is preventing the Army from waging a full-scale campaign against the bandit. This is being done to discourage the Americans and to discredit the Iranian people in the eyes of the United States. When the reporter voiced scepticism about this explanation, Borumand answered that perhaps this explanation was wrong, but this is what he and many others believe, and what people believe is more important than what actually is true.

Corruption is widespread, he went on, but no one cares because the government knows that it is being supported by powerful forces who do not want to see Iran make any progress. When asked to identify these forces, he answered that while he did not dislike the British, he felt that it was the British and to some extent the Russians. This corruption and bad government, he continued, is playing into the hands of the extremists.

Mr. Borumand went on to say that there are few Communists in Iran at present, most of them being in Tehran, Isfahan and in the north. If free elections were to be held, no Communist would be elected to the Majlis. The agricultural [redacted]* would control the elections, and these groups are strongly opposed to Communism. Even in the cities, the liberal elements are opposed to Communism and would not support its advocates. If moderate leaders could be put into power now, they could be able to put a program of good government into effect. The program would include the dismissal of corrupt government officials and the collection of taxes in an honest and equitable way.

When asked how the Army fits into the plans of liberal thinking people in Iran, he replied that the Army has no real influence in the country. Most of the officers are corrupt and will do anything that the Shah tells them. The others think in the same way as the liberals and would support any honest government.

In being asked whether he knew if there has been any Communist infiltration into the Iran Party or into the National Resistance Movement, he replied by saying that the leaders are aware of communist tactics, and the few Communists are known. He is very really acquainted with many members of the Iran Party and the NRM, and he is sure that they are not Communists. He is not a party member himself, but he sympathizes with the objectives of these groups. When asked whom he considers to be representative of the men associated with these groups, he mentioned Allaye [illegible], Sadiq [illegible], Mir [illegible], and General Riahi, former Shiraz Corps Commander, who now occupies a position on the General Staff.

*powers

/ At present





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At present, 95% of the educated class of people are pro-American. The United States must therefore support the more liberal elements, or these groups will become disillusioned. The Americans should not be afraid of changes because these will only make Iran stronger which is the object of American policy in the Middle East. However, if they support these elements, they must do so now, and not after they come to power.

Mr. Borumand was asked if he might be able to arrange a meeting with friends of his living in Isfahan who feel the same way. He was rather reticent at first, but finally agreed that he would think about it and let the Consulate know.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN DR. ABDORRAHMAN BORUMAND, MR. (FNU) ATASH, THREE OF THE FORMER'S BROTHERS, MR. JOSEPH SALTSMAN AND THE REPORTING OFFICER

The following conversation between Dr. Abdorrahman Borumand, Mr. (fnu) Atash, three of the former's brothers, Mr. Joseph Saltsman and the reporting officer took place on October 10, 1957 at the Borumand home in Isfahan.

After introducing Mr. Atash and his brothers, Dr. Borumand began in the same vein as the previous conversations. The people of Iran are despairing, he said, that conditions will improve in the immediate future or even in their childrens' lifetime. Since the government is not responsible to the people, the people in turn feel no love or respect for it. If the present leaders were changed, then this would also affect the underlings in the various offices. If the Minister of Finance were completely honest, for example, those under him would be afraid to commit dishonest acts. However, those in power now are corrupt and will continue to be as long as British foreign policy is able to give them sustenance, real or otherwise. The United States has had frustrations in Iran in the past, and all of these, in the opinion of both Borumand and Atash, were the work of the British. Borumand proceeded to explain that the failure of the Shuster Mission, the murder of the American Vice Consul in the 20's, and the recent Qashqai murders were examples of the activities of the pro-British elements who do not want to see the United States remain in Iran for fear that their position will be affected. If the United States does nothing to change this situation, Iran can very well turn into a Syria. This the United States must not let happen.

Everytime anyone speaks out his mind in Iran the government immediately accuses him of being a Communist. But many of the people whom it is currently arresting in Tehran are not Communists. If they were, then the government as in the west would announce it in the newspapers. This it is not doing because it is afraid of what the public will think. When asked the number of people involved, Borumand replied that he had heard 50, but Atash interrupted by saying that he had heard that morning that about 70 people had thus far been arrested. If this repression continues, Borumand resumed, and if the Iranians see that the United States does not concern itself with mitigating it, in another two or three years they may turn to others who will do something about it.

Considering all the money the United States has poured into Iran, what positive results can be shown Borumand asked. Borumand's brother interrupted and said that this money would have been better used had it been given to private individuals in small amounts. If he had it he could have built five more villages like his between Isfahan and Marcha Khard on the Tehran road.

Britain and the U.S. should be friends in the west, but in the Middle East the U.S. should pursue a different policy, Borumand then added. When asked what the United States policy should be vis-a-vis Iran, Borumand answered that it must put more liberal men in charge of the government. When queried as to what method should be used to accomplish this, he replied that the same method that was used to put Zahedi in over four years ago should be used now





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now.

Atash then said that many people in Iran were afraid to express their true opinions to Americans or to associate with them. For example, he had been asked to join the Iran-American Society when it opened, but he refused, as he refused to join anything else. He knows that the same small group controls everything and they do not and will not hear the truth spoken. Mr. Borumand interrupted to say that Americans are not surrounded by good people and as a result they do not hear the truth. The reporter then replied that Americans are well-aware of the present situation and who represented it faithfully to them and who did not. However, they find themselves in a very difficult position and the difference between advice and interference is small, but one that is very important. Borumand replied that the moderates in Iran do not want the Americans to interfere. Rather they want the present leadership replaced by people who will not look on the Americans as employers but as friends. The difference between a paid servant and a friend is also important, particularly today when the United States needs true friends in the United Nations and elsewhere.

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October 2, 1961

Conversation with Dr. Abdorrahman Boromand

There is enclosed a memorandum of conversation with Dr. Abdorrahman [illegible]. Dr. Boromand was a National Front candidate in Isfahan in the Majlis elections of 1960 and 1961. He was arrested in the round-up of National Front leaders immediately preceding the planned National Front demonstration of July 21 and was released from prison in mid-September.

While he did not seem particularly encouraged over the immediate prospects of the National Front, he said that he and his associates intended to continue the struggle to transform Iran's government. He clearly implied that, in his opinion at least, this could only be accomplished in the absence of the Shah.

When National Front members say, as did Boromand, that they have "made efforts over the past few years to reach some sort of an understanding with the Shah" but have been rebuffed, what they mean is something like the following: The National Front has, in effect, said that under the type of government they advocate (never very clearly defined) the Shah could play a powerless and largely ceremonial role. The Shah clearly has never had any intention of playing such a role and would leave the country rather than do so. He has, therefore, "rebuffed" the National Front. It is hard to believe that the National Front could ever have thought they were offering the Shah something acceptable. Since the Shah's attack on the National Front in his 28th of Mordad speech, the National Front seems to have come closer to acknowledging what they have really had in mind all along as their principal political objective--whether they have known it or not--i.e. the ouster of the Shah and the formation of a Republic, of sorts. It is hardly surprising that the Shah would "rebuff" such an idea.

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Enclosure:
Memo of Conversation

Copy to:
All Consulates Iran

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For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim:

Harry H. Schwartz
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs



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162
Amembassy TEHRAN

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: September 27, 1961.

PLACE: Suren's Restaurant

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Abdorrahman Boromand
Franklin J. Crawford, Second Secretary of Embassy

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Dr. Boromand described his 56 days in the Tehran police jail following his arrest on July 20 as relatively pleasant, saying he had ample time for reading and exercise and was well provided for with food sent from home.

During the time of his imprisonment he had frequent contact with Mehdi Bazargan, the leader of the National Freedom Movement. Boromand said that the differences between the National Front and the National Freedom Movement were practically non-existent. Bazargan represents a more religious element in the nationalist group than members of the National Front, and is himself personally very religious. Dr. Boromand described adherents of the National Freedom Movement as perhaps "more violent" than the moderate leadership of the National Front. He intimated that the differences between the two groups were more of emphasis than of anything else.

Before his release from prison Dr. Boromand was obliged to give a guarantee that he would not leave Tehran without the permission of the security authorities. His wife and children have now come to Tehran from Isfahan, and he is busy seein to the completion of a house which he is building in Shemran. After that he intends to open a law practice.

Dr. Boromand described the present government of Dr. Amini as illegal and unconstitutional. He said that if he were forced to make a choice, he would be obliged to say that Dr. Amini's Government represents an improvement over the past governments of Sharif-Emami and Eqbal. Nevertheless, Amini has demonstrated to Boromand's satisfaction that his government is essentially feeble and has obtained no meaningful authority from the Shah. The Shah, he said, still commands the army, the police and the security forces, and these represent the real power in the country.

He said that an accommodation between the Amini Government and the National Front was a present impossibility. This stems from the fact that the Amini Government is essentially the Shah's government and the Shah is not prepared to concede anything to the National Front. The National Front, he said, has made efforts over the past few years to reach some sort of an understanding with the Shah but has been completely rebuffed. The Shah's attitude toward the National Front was reaffirmed at the "historic meeting" on the 28th of Mordad. Power is blind, Boromand said, as history demonstrates, and there is nothing to suggest that the Shah will change his views and make any concessions.

Consequently, Borumand and his associates will continue to work for the emergence of a nationalist government. The very clear implication of his statements was that this could only come about with the removal of the Shah.

Dr. Borumand, in a quiet and determined fashion, said that he personally intended to continue the struggle of the National Front for a change in Iran's form of government. In reply to a question about future plans, specifically reports of a student strike at the University of Tehran in early October, he said that it was not yet certain that the strike would be attempted.



CONFIDENTIAL



Mr. Harry H. Schwartz February 11, 1963

Joseph P. Lorenz

Conversation with Abdorrahman BORUMAND

I had a short talk yesterday with Abdorrahman BORUMAND, former leader of the Isfahan contingent of the National Front and presently active in Tehran N.F. Affairs, concerning the Government's present policy toward the Front. Borumand said he was certain that the trial of the N.F. leadership would be secret and by military court; he added that he understood the Shah had demanded stiff sentences for the top leaders. Those presently in jail, he said, were being held incommunicado, without the normal privileges of seeing their families or being allowed to receive food from outside. He remarked that he personally was under fairly constant control and surveillance by SAVAK.

Borumand said that President Kennedy had needlessly encouraged the Shah in his repressive policy toward the N.F. by sending him a letter of congratulation. When I replied that the President's remarks had applied to the referendum alone, which was after all an outstanding success for the government, he answered that the referendum had been shamelessly rigged - that he personally had watched one government busload vote at four separate polling places.

Borumand was more bitter and depressed than I have ever seen him. He seemed to realize that political opposition was no longer simply the exciting pastime it had been, but that one's political acts would in the future have to be carefully weighed against their consequences

cc: Mr. Rockwell
Mr. Tiger, GTI
BIO
Reading file
CRU

POL: JPLorenz:cah

CONFIDENTIAL

R:o

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Mr. Martin F. Herz

April 28, 1954

Joseph P. Loreman

Expected Changes in the National Front Leadership

Abdol Rahman BORUMAND, one of the younger National Front leaders who was recently elected to the Central Council, talked with me Saturday night about the changes which he anticipated would take place shortly in the leadership of the National Front. (Borumand, by the way, did not accept his own seat on the Council at his wife's request.) He said that Mossadeq's letters, calling for a coalition of all opposition elements like that of the '50's, had struck a responsive chord among those in the Front (including himself) who were tired of the inaction of the present conservative leadership. He said he believed that a conference would soon be called consisting of two representatives from each group which opposed the government to choose a new leadership. The groups, he thought, would consist of the Iran Party, the Freedom Movement of Iran, Dariush Foruhar's Melate Iran Party, a contingent from the bazaar, and the clergy if it would agree to participate. (He did not mention Azimi and his associates.) As for the mullahs, Borumand agreed that their ultimate aims were inconsistent with those of the Front; even though this was understood by both groups, he said, the two would have to reach some sort of modus vivendi if anything were to be accomplished. In Borumand's opinion, the person who would be most likely to head a coalition group in opposition to the government would be Shahpur BAKHTIAR, who presently controls the Iran Party.

COMMENT

The lack of precision as to how the coalition was to be formed, what it was to do once it was established (Borumand said every one was against street demonstrations) and what the attitude of the present leadership would be to the changes made me think that a good deal of the above still represent wishful thinking on the part of certain younger National Front members. If ... should come to pass, particularly under the leadership of Bakhtiar, it seems to me that it would be a significant political development, and a highly dangerous one from the standpoint of the regime.

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FCL-reading
OR
CSL
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RTO

Group 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals.
Declassified 12 years after date of origin.

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Form for Diplomats, Officials, Eminent Persons, Journalists, etc. (Amended Sept. 1938)

Post Tehran

Date of preparation May 10, 1951

# CONFIDENTIAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA

NOTE.—Consult *Diplomatic Serial 5555 of April 10, 1941*, and references therein. Forms are to be prepared on typewriter in triplicate, one copy for files and two for Department.

Name SANJABI (Surname) Karim (Given names)

Nationality Iranian Title, if any Doctor of Law

Date and place of birth 1904, at Sanjabi tribal area in Kermanshah

Position Minister of Education Date appointed May 3, 1951

Party affiliations Formerly in Iran Party. National Front affiliations.

Previous career See below

Languages spoken French, Persian

Attitude toward and service in the United States

Family details A member of the Sanjabi tribe (Kurdish). Brother, Hasan Khan, was Chief of the tribe from 1945 to 1947. Uncle, Asadollah Khan, has been chieftain ever since. One uncle, Malar Zafar, is currently in Russia, where he fled when Reza Shah was persecuting tribal leaders. Married.

REMARKS: (Should present a brief word picture of the individual, including race, religion, fraternal affiliations, education, reputation, personality, influence, attitude toward other nations, etc.)

Education: University of Tehran Law College.
Law College, University of Paris.

Career:

1917: When thirteen years of age, his tribe was attacked by British forces and he was exiled with members of his tribe to Sanjabad.
1919: Returned to Kermanshah.
1919 - : Studied at Kermanshah High School.
1927-29: Studied law at University of Tehran Law College.
1929-35: Sent to France by Government to complete law studies. Obtained doctorate in law. Wrote thesis entitled "Agricultural Reforms in Iran."
1935: Returned to Iran and was appointed Associate Instructor, Law College, University of Tehran.
1937: Worked in University Secretariat in addition to other duties.
1940: Appointed Director of General and Statistics, Ministry of Finance.
1941: Principal of a Tehran High School, where students were trained for employment in the Ministry of Finance.
1944: Dean of the Law College.
1946: Vice-President of the Law College.
1949: Accompanied Dr. Mossadeq in seeking "bast" at the Court as a protest against Tehran's elections. Became affiliated with National Front.
May 3, 1951: Minister of Education, Mossadeq's Cabinet.

Prepared by Mary Ruth Farrish/ Muriah Shahbaz

Biographic Clerk / Research Assistant
(Title)



U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—[illegible]

SANJABI, Karim

Remarks:

Dr. Sanjabi is an influential tribal leader who carries considerable weight with Kurdish and other tribal leaders in the majlis. He has a successful law practice -- good, successful, and expensive -- and is an important member of the Law College, where he is fairly popular with students and teachers.

Dr. Sanjabi is the only member of the new Cabinet who has had any close association with the National Front Party (with the exception of Dr. Hasan Ardalan). In all probability, he was pressed upon Dr. Mossadeq by Hosein Makki and Dr. Seyed Ali Shayegan, the most leftist members of the party. Shayegan's friendship with Sanjabi dates from the days of Mossadeq's Iran Party, when they were both part of the leftist wing. Sanjabi has retained his leftist leanings, and consequently embassy observers are dubious about his participation in the Cabinet, generally agreeing that the choice was not a good one. While he probably has no actual Communist sympathies, his position as Minister of Education -- at a time when there is decidedly Tudeh influence in the schools -- is a particularly sensitive one.

Dr. Sanjabi has modern educational views and will, according to one informant, want to change the entire program of the Ministry, bring the curriculum of public schools more up to date.

Though little known to American officers, Iranian commentators say that Dr. Sanjabi is very pleasant, converses well, and has an attractive wife who frequently appears socially.



AIR POUCH — PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL — (Security Classification)

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AmEmbassy TEHRAN — 261 DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON. — November 22, 1960 DATE

REF : Tehran's Despatch No. 486, February 8, 1960.

SUBJECT: **Conversation with Dr. Kerim SANJABI**

**There is enclosed a Memorandum of Conversation between Dr. Kerim Sanjabi and William L. Eagleton, American Consul, Tabriz. Dr. Kerim Sanjabi was one of Mosadeq's Ministers of Education. He is a member of a prominent Kurdish family and continues to teach at the University of Tehran. His comments indicate that he is very much interested in a return to politics.**

For the Charge d' Affaires ad interim:

Harry H. Schwartz
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

Enclosure:
Memorandum of Conversation.

cc: All Consulates Iran
OR
ECON
AIR ATTACHE
ARMY ATTACHE
NAVY ATTACHE

POL:FJCrawford:meb — REPORTER

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Encl. No. 1, Desp. No. 281
AmEmbassy TEHRAN

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Karim SANJABI, Opposition political leader and Professor of Law at Tehran University.
Lillian L. Eagleton, American Consul, Tabriz.

DATE: November 15, 1960

PLACE: Dr. Sanjabi's home in Tehran.

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On the basis of my friendship with his nephew and son who are students in the United States, I called on Dr. Sanjabi at his home in Tehran on November 15. Much of the conversation concerned members of his family in the United States and historical questions about the Kermanshah area and the Sanjabi tribe of which his brother, ASKAR KHAN, is chief. On the question of politics Dr. Sanjabi made the following observations.

1. Dr. Sanjabi indicated that National Front political leaders anticipated a change in U.S. policy toward Iran as a result of Mr. Kennedy's election. Although he seemed to anticipate a change favorable to the opposition, Dr. Sanjabi had no clear idea of what might be involved.

2. He is now in effect the leader of the Iran Party of the National Front in Tehran.

3. On a number of occasions intermediates have tried to convince him that he should ask to see the Shah. He has declined to do so thus far because such a meeting would be on a personal basis whereas he feels that he should see the Shah only as a representative of the Iran Party.

4. He was active during the latter stages of the last Majlis elections, contributing his efforts towards bringing about their voiding. The activities of his group were not publicized in the press, but otherwise he was relatively free in expressing his opposition.

5. He felt that public opinion was overwhelmingly against the present regime and that something would have to give way eventually. He hoped that the Shah would take steps that "would recognize the aspirations of the people." He thought that if "free" elections were held his party would win most of the seats in Tehran. He argued that his group represented a more effective barrier to communism and the USSR than the unpopular men now in power.

6. If there were any prospects that the elections would be "free", Dr. Sanjabi would contest a seat either in Tehran or in Kermanshah. (He held a seat from Kermanshah during the Mosadeq era, at which time he represented the Iranian oil case at the World Court and was for a time Minister of Education.)



Air Pouch
PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL
(Security Classification)

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

TO : AmEmbassy, TEHRAN

FROM : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

553
DESP. NO.

19 APR 1961
April 18, 1961
DATE

REF : Embassy Desp. 281, November 22, 1960.

SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Karim Sanjabi.

There is enclosed a memorandum of conversation with Dr. Karim SANJABI, Professor of Law at the University of Tehran and a member of the Executive Committee of the National Front. Dr. Sanjabi covered the usual opposition ground with some interesting sidelights on the taking of sanctuary in the Senate by National Front leaders and on National Front contacts with the government. What was noteworthy in the conversation was the degree of optimism Dr. Sanjabi exhibited. Even as he recited the usual defeats and difficulties, he imparted the impression that the National Front in recent months had clearly put the government on the spot. The government, he believes, is at a loss how to deal with a movement which voices the honest aspirations of the Iranian people.

For the Ambassador:

Harry H. Schwartz
Counselor for Embassy
for Political Affairs

Enclosure:
Memorandum of Conversation

cc: All Consulates Iran
AmEmbassy, LONDON
OR
ECON
AIR ATTACHE
ARMY ATTACHE
NAVAL ATTACHE

POL:FCrawford:mwb

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350.1 Pol Parts. Political Front
1 350 Iran

April 11, 1961

April 11, 1961

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After some desultory conversation about his family, Mr. Sanjabi described the political situation in Iran, as it operates under the present regime, as very bad indeed. He said that the only change is that Ardalan are replaced by those just as bad. The new Cabinet represents no change. Recent changes in the security forces offer little hope for improvement. General ALAVI is of the same ilk as his predecessor. General [illegible] is an intellectual and enlightened person, but he has the same political benefactors as General NAKHAI. General KHAB is, however, better than his predecessor. General ALA-AZIZI gained a good reputation during his tenure as chief of the Gendarmerie, but since becoming Minister of the Interior he has shown his true colors by presiding over the election of HAJ ASADI as deputy from Meshkin Shar. Mr. Asadi is the prince of thieves, he said.

As for National Front activities, Mr. Sanjabi said that the main interest now is to develop provincial organizations in Tabriz, Meshed, Isfahan and Shiraz. Following that, the National Front hopes to organize in Khuzestan. There are no plans for further demonstrations at the University of Tehran during this academic year, since it is important that the students not lose the benefit of a year's university work. The forthcoming Senate elections still offer a further opportunity for National Front activities. Since only literates are eligible to vote, the National Front hopes to enlist the support of many prominent elements in its campaign for the eleven Senate seats in Tehran. He did not say that the National Front would run eleven candidates, nor did he name any individuals as candidates.

Support for the National Front, he said, comes from three main groups: University students, bazaar merchants, and factory workers. In the latter category, he mentioned specifically workers at the government tobacco and cement factories and the government silos. The support of the National Front is so great in Tehran, he stated, that had the recent elections been free, the National Front could have elected fifteen deputies. He said that the one National Front representative in the Majlis, Allayar SAHABI, could not take much of a stand in the face of 199 "non-representatives", but he did admit that one representative was better than nothing.

On the question of Tudeh infiltration in the National Front, Mr. Sanjabi said that naturally it was possible for such infiltration to occur but that the National Front was ever-watchful to prevent it. This was particularly true of the Central Council and the Executive Committee, where he could say there was no Tudeh



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[illegible]

restraints imposed by the government. It cannot, for example, hold meetings at its club in Fakhrabad, although the administrative office of the National Front is permitted to operate on the premises. Opinion of the National Front is forbidden in the newspapers. While the government does not openly forbid National Front activity, it is attempting to follow a policy of non-recognition. Nonetheless, the National Front is encouraged by the response it has received on such "non-political" occasions as the funeral of and memorial services for the recently deceased National Front leader, Mahmud NARIMAN.

Sanjabi averred,

The key to the political future of Iran rests with the Shah, who holds all power. Unfortunately, he is not the intelligent, courageous man his father was. Even though the late Shah was despotic and avaricious, he was a true leader and a patriot. His son does not have these qualities. Instead, he is afraid of everyone. He was a friend of [illegible] and Mossadeq because they were strong figures. He is afraid of the National Front; he is even afraid of Dr. Ali Amini. Anyone who is efficient, whether they pose a threat to his discomfort or intrigue, is afraid of [illegible].



# FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

EVALUATION OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. *(Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence).* F: Reliability cannot be judged *(Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).*

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

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REPORT/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY Iran

REPORT NO. NIT-5578

SUBJECT Interview with Karim Sanjabi
1. Biographic
2. Opinions

DATE OF REPORT 3 July 1961

NO. OF PAGES 6

REFERENCES 0

DATE OF INFO. June 1961

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Iran, Tehran (22 June 1961)

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Competent American observer (B).
Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. Biographic data on Karim Sanjabi, chairman of the executive board of the National Front (NF), is as follows:

   a. Age: 56.

   b. Education: Primary, Kermanshah; secondary, Tehran; degree in political science, University of Tehran; law license, France; and a doctorate in law, Paris.

   c. Languages: Farsi, Kurdish, French, Arabic, and English (reads a bit).

   d. Occupation: Professor of law, University of Tehran.

   e. Travel: In addition to six years as a student in France, he has visited most European countries. He traveled to the United States with Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953.

   f. Sanjabi is married and has three children, aged nine, twelve, and about twenty.

   g. Sanjabi was appointed Minister of Education by Mohammad Mossadeq and was a member of the seventeenth Majlis.

   h. Sanjabi lives in a respectable old home in Tehran, near Darvasheh-e-Tehran. His house is neatly furnished and appears well kept, but is far from ostentatious. Sanjabi himself is a man of unimposing stature, perhaps five feet eight inches tall, on the stout side but not unpleasantly so. His slightly gray and wavy hair rises from a rather high forehead. He dresses conservatively and presentably. He is a man of great personal charm, with great natural politeness.

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He is soft spoken, but direct. He gives the impression of being quite in control of the situation, being neither hesitant nor evasive, but always to the point. He is a man who has devoted considerable thought to many topics, and his opinions are well formed and sensible. Zanjabi is a man of apparent honesty and grace. He is a devoted family man, as well as an earnest and sincere politician. While his responses may have been particularly designed to appeal to an American, there was nothing in his behavior to indicate that he was attempting to mislead or deceive.

2. The following were opinions expressed by Zanjabi on different published issues.

Economic Aid. Economic aid must continue for Iran. It is a definite necessity. However, the large sums contributed by the United States during the past several years have not gained friendship for the United States. The people of Iran do not know how much aid you have given, even, nor where it has gone. It may have gone to various places, into the construction of roads or dams or something else, or it may have been largely stolen. To be useful, to be fruitful, to gain friendship for the United States, such aid should come to Iran when there is a government in power that the people support and respect. For better returns will then be found for each dollar contributed. Importantly, one must consider the kind of aid given and considered. We have about three hundred thousand people employed by the government. These people must be paid, fed, and sheltered in order that government affairs may run smoothly, and in order that aid programs, among others, may be carried out. But they must be paid out of our own resources, and not by foreigners. With foreign aid in other fields, we sometimes can pay our local currencies. Foreign economic assistance should be directed solely to programs contributing to economic development of the country, to raising the level of productivity. Further foreign aid should not come merely as a bundle of money, to be dispersed at the whim of the Government of Iran. Money should be given only for specific projects and programs, studied and selected jointly by the given and the Government of Iran. The funds given should be evidently that to the accomplishment of the given project. Short controllability should be maintained, and the granting of subsequent aid should be dependent on the satisfactory completion of previous projects. It might be held that this would constitute and "with strings attached," but I do not feel that it should or would constitute any kind of infringement on the sovereignty or independence of the receiving country. A government that is truly popular would have no difficulty with such a program. That represents the kind of aid program I would welcome for Iran. I feel that we will need foreign economic aid for at least another five to ten years.

Technical Aid. Foreign advisors will be welcome and popular whenever the country that sends them is well liked by the people of Iran. Within the economic aid scheme outlined above there is a place for foreign advisors. I would certainly come to it that Iranians are employed whenever and wherever possible, but we will need foreign technical assistance for some time to come.

Aid from Soviets. We would, under certain circumstances, accept aid from the Soviet Union. For one thing, relations would have to be such, with the Soviets, that they would cease actively all their disruptive propaganda in Iran. This means both pro-Communist propaganda, and that propaganda or agitation that militates against the internal unity of the Iranian nation. In the second place, we could not accept aid from the Soviet Union if such aid necessitated or was accompanied by a cessation of aid from the West, primarily from the United States, presumably. And also, we could not accept aid from the Soviets in a relationship with the Soviets. If the Middle East should become a true collective security unit (see below), we could accept aid from the Soviets. If all these conditions were met, we could accept aid from the Soviets on the same terms as from the West. If such conditions were not met, however, there would be no objection to the continuation of United States aid unilaterally, i.e., without request for any Soviet aid program.





CENTO. This pact has several strikes against it. First, the people of Iran are not favorably oriented toward the pact, because Iran's participation resulted from an act of an irregular and non-responsible government. Secondly, it is believed to necessitate large outlays of money; it is believed to cost more, perhaps, than it is worth. Thirdly, CENTO creates the serious danger, for us, of engendering the enmity of the Soviets. It is necessary for us to have an opportunity accurately to assess the positive factors of CENTO in order to determine whether they outweigh its defects. We do not put too much trust in the worth of such undertakings. The Baghdad Pact was completely ignored by its signatories. And the inclusion of the British in CENTO gives us little comfort, as we cannot rely on their obligation. I believe that the bilateral pact with the United States offers a more substantial guarantee for Iran against Soviet aggression. And I am certainly not inclined to give up this bilateral agreement freely, that is, without gaining something equivalent in return. The only time we can be sure of the Soviets is when we are sure of the United States. We do not want to become another Poland or Rumania, but we would not even have that until under Soviet domination. Iran would be dismembered: Azerbaijan, Kurdestan, and Khuzistan would all be chopped off by the Soviets.

Neutrality. If neutrality means, for Iran, separation from its friendly relations with the United States and being drawn very close to the Soviets, then I do not want neutrality. I do not want phony neutrality. It is not to the benefit of our country. I envisage a system whereby the Middle East, from, say, Egypt to Pakistan and possibly including India, should form a unit, composed of independent states, organized together for collective security, under a kind of supervision by the Great Powers. I recognize that there are great differences separating these Middle Eastern states, and that this is a very ambitious scheme, but I have faith that, with the good will of all concerned, this could someday become a reality. Under such circumstances Iran could become truly neutral, united in this way with her neighbors. But Iran alone is not in a position to pretend to be neutral as far as the Soviet Union is concerned.

Elections. Our great and deep fear is that, in the absence of a Majlis, certain elements might conspire to bring about a purely dictatorial regime, perhaps under military rule. Any Majlis, even the latest one, serves as some obstacle to such a move, or at least the absence of a Majlis facilitates such a move. Under the present circumstances we would prefer that elections be held as soon as possible. Perhaps the NF could only win twenty seats at the present time, but that plus the very existence of a Majlis, would be enough to make more difficult the assumption of a dictatorial regime. On the other hand, if we could be certain that there would be three of four or five months of the situation continuing on a more or less stable, if not quite legal, basis, it would be to our benefit to wait longer for elections. Three or four months would permit us to become better organized, and hence to win more seats. But we cannot be sure, in the atmosphere of today, that tomorrow will not find me in jail and the country being ruled by a military dictator.

Land Reform. There must be land reform in Iran. But there are other considerations, too. Sudden division of land would dramatically reduce agricultural production. Good landlords know better than their peasants - or even than the government - about how to run a farm, to provide the necessities. And they have the capital with which to do so. It is essential first that the peasants be made a part of the national endeavor, that they participate and contribute in a national sense. This is a matter of awareness and attitude. A national program is needed to improve agriculture, to increase production, to make the life of the peasant more reasonable. Then education is also needed. Much time and many programs are necessary before we can safely arrive at the point where landholdings can be broken up.

Size of Military. If we have assurances from our allies for our

defense, then the size of our army is far too great. With guarantees, a well trained army of fifty to sixty thousand men should suffice for a country like Iran.

Steel Mill. I am not sure that we have sufficient iron and coal deposits. The little, and uncertain, information that I have seems to indicate that we do. If we do, so that it is economically feasible to have a steel mill, Iran should certainly have one. Such a mill would serve as a necessary element in the industrial development of Iran, which should go hand in hand with agricultural development. Public opinion is a strong force in favor of a steel mill. It is a popular love affair. But, if economically unsound, I do not believe we should say, say, ten million dollars for a prestige symbol. A sound, logical program for industrial development is essential for Iran, however, since our agricultural capacity for expansion is severely limited by lack of water and arable lands.

Goodwill Mission to USSR. If there were a NF government, I would use a goodwill mission, or whatever other devices were available, to attempt to eliminate such misunderstandings as may prevent good, normal relations with the Soviet Union - if possible. I do not honestly know whether this would be possible or not, though. Again, Iran alone cannot accomplish anything vis-a-vis the Soviets. Only by maintaining good and proper relations with the West, and only with the help and understanding of the West, can we maintain good and safe relations with them.

Tudeh (Communist) Party Strength and Capabilities; NF-Tudeh Relationship. We honestly do not know much about the strength of the Tudeh nor of its personalities and organization. But from time to time, in our various gatherings, we know that they are there among us. We feel their effect within the NF. There is nothing specific about this. It is as if we can smell them. We recognize their presence by the extreme pressures they apply for extreme measures. For example, they urge us to use the name of Mossadeq too much. They want us to attack CENTO strongly; or to attack the oil consortium.

Major General Fazmatollah Nasiri told me he knows there are Tudehs in the NF. I told him I agreed, but do not know who they are. I asked him to identify them for us, but he refused saying that this information belongs to the government and is secret. I asked him why it should be always secret. Is he keeping it for posterity? It is a national service to identify these people, so they can be culled out. He said nothing in reply.

I know that they are there, but I cannot put my finger on them. All we can do to oppose them is to resist their wild pressures and use extreme care to be certain that only thoroughly reliable and trusted persons have responsible positions in the NF. I can assure you that you cannot find a Tudeh, or a real leftist in any of our organizations or committees. Leftist and extremist sentiments are most pronounced among the youth, the university students. We appointed our NF student leaders, rather than allowing them to be elected, in order to ensure that the leftists would not be in positions of leadership.

NF Organization and Strength. It is our policy at present to test continually the government's restrictions on our activities. That is, we are trying to go as far as possible with our organizational activities. We proceed to the point where we meet the government's active resistance. In this manner we maintain pressure at all points simultaneously, and are able to take advantage of any weakness or laxity in their defenses. And once we have gained ground we are reluctant to give it up again, although [illegible]n yield in one place in order to gain an advantage elsewhere. Particularly we are applying this form of constant pressure in the provinces. Currently Mahdi Nasr and Hassan Nasibi are in Mashad for organizational purposes. We will be sending people to Isfahan, Shiraz and Rasht in the near future. Asghar Parsa





went to Shiraz recently and a committee has been formed there. That committee is made up of good men, but they are not functioning well yet. They need time and experience in order to be able to work together satisfactorily. The organizational work in Tehran is coming along quite well. There have been many difficulties in this field, but at present all is going smoothly.

NF-Iran Party Relations. There have been some difficulties in this field. For the most part, however, there have not been too serious. On the part of some of the smaller party members and non-party people there has been some suspicion that the Iran Party has been trying to dominate the NF through obtaining all the responsible positions, committee chairmanships, and so forth. This suspicion still remains, in some instances, but does not appear to be an insurmountable problem. Basically, the Iran Party deserts the other parties, such as the Iran-Ibran or People of Iran parties, and they could not hope to compete against the Iran Party.

Who is the leader of the NF? In actuality, no one. Moussadeq plays no role in the NF at present. He is greatly loved, but plays no role. If the NF were to assume power tomorrow, I presume that Allahyar Saleh would become Prime Minister; he has the broadest base. It would be better for the NF to have a personality, such as Moussadeq, as a true and individual leader, but we do not have such a personality at present, and must be satisfied with our present collective leadership, which is working quite well.

National Freedom Movement of Iran (NFMI). This group has been a real nettle to us. As you know, Hadji Razmara was formerly on the NF council. But then this group put out a pamphlet attacking some of us, including Saleh and myself, as being tools of the Americans, working to wear out the blood of Patriots by pretending to be nationalists and pleasing the people. We had a certain discussion with Razmara about this. Most these people wanted to stir up trouble within the army, and we were opposed to this. Still, Razmara remained in the NF until the time came when he was not elected to the executive committee. Then he left the NF council, and now he has set up this NFMI. This group is truly an enigma to us in the NF. It has a strong religious bent and yet, at the same time, it is an anarchist group. It is not leftist, but it is ruthlessly anarchistic. There may be some leftists among them, however.

If we can be certain that they are sincere, we will admit them to the NF. But we are not sure of them yet. We must wait a while to see how they behave in order to determine whether they are genuine. If they are not accepted into the NF, their influence will be slight, and they might break up altogether. Certain of the NFMI members could certainly be admitted to the NF as individuals. Frankly, however, I doubt that the NFMI will be able to gain acceptance in the NF. Nonetheless, they remain a nettle in our skin.

Ali Amini and the NF. The Shah is not on good terms with Amini's government. Amini is not close with the military. The situation is very unstable. The situation is such that we cannot wait, as I have said, for elections. Thus we must constantly urge Amini to hold the elections quickly.

I personally have been a friend of Amini for a long time. He is upright and is possessed of good will, too, but he cannot represent the ideal government, because he does not enjoy the love of the people; he cannot gain their enthusiasm. He cannot succeed in a reform program because the Shah is not being sincere with him; because he cannot gain popular affection. And he does not have the strength truly to oppose the Shah.

The NF wishes, waits and hopes. We cannot oppose him strongly. On the other hand, the Shah will not tolerate Amini's getting too close to us, so we must not put him in an untenable position that way, either. Amini appears to be sniffing at us since our latest press conference, though. The police removed one club's sign. There have been problems about students'

passports in America. I have tried to contact him on these matters, and he will not talk to me. In the provinces, where the government is obstructing our activities, Amini tells either the will or the strength to prevent [illegible] police and the National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK) from opposing us. Amini's connections to the Shah are growing daily and with each concession he grows weaker. In the case of Khuzestan, where Ahmad-ol-Din Jamgarei has been appointed governor general, we feel certain that Jamgarei at least will not be active against us. Jamgarei could have been a useful go-between for Amini and the NF in Tehran, but there remain plenty of other means for us to deal successfully with one another.

United States Role. The United States has tested many different governments in Iran. The Shah has been tested, and has not produced a satisfactory or successful result. The Shah rules a personal government, without resorting to popular will, and this cannot solve Iran's problems. You have also tried a military government under Qarnagh Fazlollah Zahedi, and you found that wanting, too. Our officers may be able to speak loudly and perhaps can run some organizations, but a good, successful and popular government cannot be run by our military. They can dictate, but they cannot govern. And now you have also tried to find a "strong man" who can rule and who can stand against the Shah. This cannot work, either, because he has neither the Shah, the army, nor the people to support him.

Why not try one other and different kind of government? Why not try a government that is chosen by the people? If you should try this, I am confident that it would work to the benefit of Iran and the free world.

Field Comment: This is a report of one of several interviews that will be held with members of the National Front. The American observer, because of his friendship and lengthy relationship with members of the National Front is believed to be in a position to develop useful and forthright information.

NOFORN/CONTROLLED COMBAT

SECRET





Iran

Statements of Karim Sanjabi on National Front Policy



July-August 1961

Iran, Tehran (1-19 August 1961)

From a National Front member (F) with access to National Front leaders.
Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. Karim Sanjabi, chairman of the National Front (NF) executive committee, stated in August 1961 that if and when the NF took over the government it must stabilize the political situation in five days to include a decision by the Shah whether he would reign or rule. If he wants to reign, the Shah must go. The political situation would have to be stabilized in five days to encourage foreign investment and assistance, also.

2. The NF has worked out an export/import policy it would follow in the event it took over the government. Imports would be rated on a numerical scale, beginning with the easiest items to export, such as rugs, and ending with items most difficult to export. Imports also would be rated on a numerical scale, with the items Iran needs most listed first and luxury goods rated last. Exporters would be allowed to import items of the same numerical category as they exported; thus, the man who exports items easy to sell abroad would only be allowed to import machinery and other items badly needed in Iran, while the man who develops a new export market would be allowed to import luxury goods. Negotiable export certificates would be given to exporters. The exporter who sells difficult-to-sell items abroad might lose on his export business, but could sell the certificate for much more than its face value since it will permit the import of luxury items.

3. Sanjabi has also said that if the NF came to power it would repay United States loans, even if the loans were contracted during the absence of a Majlis, but that the Iranian people might not allow the NF government to repay the loans since the law is clear that loans cannot be contracted legally under such conditions.

4. Sanjabi has stated flatly that he would not be in favor of accepting arms from any foreign power. The NF probably would refuse arms from any source, since it wanted a rule of law and would not come to power through

forces of arms. Several retired army officers, retired after the overthrow of the Mohammad Mossadeq government, had offered the NF help, but the NF regarded these retired officers more as civilians than as army officers.

5. Sanjabi has expressed himself as opposed to clandestine activity for the NF. He has even proposed that an agent of the National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK) be invited to every NF meeting to be sure that SAVAK had the correct story rather than a garbled version from an illiterate agent.



AIR POUCH CONFIDENTIAL

Amembassy TEHRAN 155

September 28, 1961

Conversation with Dr. Karim Sanjabi

There is enclosed a memorandum of conversation with Dr. Karim SANJABI, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the National Front. Dr. Sanjabi rehearsed all the standard complaints against the regime and said that he believed the situation in Iran was worse now than it had been preceeding the advent of the Amini Government, owing mainly to the unconstitutional action of the Amini Government in delaying elections. He said he hoped the coming academic year at the University of Tehran, where he is Professor of Law, would be calm, but he did not discount the possibility of eventual political activity on the part of students.

In general, Dr. Sanjabi seemed to be not very hopeful about National Front prospects for the immediate future.

For the Ambassador:

Harry H. Schwartz
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation.

Copy to:

All Consulates Iran.

POL: FJCrawford/amp CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

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Amembassy TEHRAN

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TIME AND PLACE: 5 p.m., September 26, 1961 at Dr. Sanjabi's home.

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Karim Sanjabi, Chairman, Executive Committee, National Front.
Franklin J. Crawford, Second Secretary of Embassy

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Dr. Sanjabi's comments on the political scene in Iran showed him to be generally discouraged. He characterized Dr. Amini as a man who was good with words but so far had produced little. The economic situation of the country was extremely bad, and, while he did not blame Dr. Amini entirely, Sanjabi said Amini was partially responsible because of the suddenness with which he had imposed restraints on the economy, particularly with regard to credit. Moreover, he described the Amini Government as a mendicant government going all over the world begging for funds. On this score, however, he allowed, with a smile, that it was only a question of degree and not of kind between the Amini Government and its predecessors.

Sanjabi spoke at some length of the government's political failures, particularly its illegal position in deferring elections indefinitely. He said that the National Front's great concern at present was to acquire freedom to act and to organize. As it is, the National Front is not allowed to operate its club or to publish newspapers or pamphlets. As a matter of fact, he said, mention of the name "National Front" is forbidden in the press, with the exception of occasional mention in the English-language press for the benefit of foreigners. As an example of this, he cited a letter written by students of Tehran University offering to participate voluntarily in the government's anti-illiteracy campaign. He said the letter appeared in Kayhan on September 26 without any indication that the letter had been signed by Tehran University students "affiliated with the National Front."

Dr. Sanjabi said he hoped and expected that the academic year at Tehran University would be calm so that the students would have an opportunity to pursue their studies and not become the victims of the imposed holidays of last year. He said that he agreed with the government and the security organizations that the University was not a proper arena for political activity. On the other hand, he said, students were entitled to a meeting place at which they could discuss their political ideas. Therefore, he had suggested to the Prime Minister at a recent meeting, which included members of the National Front and the Chancellor of the University, that the National Front Club be allowed to open. The Prime Minister countered with his own proposal that a Palace of Youth be opened as a gathering place for students. Dr. Sanjabi said he told the Prime Minister that he doubted any government-sponsored organization like this would amount to anything more than the government-sponsored Melliyun





and Mardom parties. He added his belief that the students simply would not avail themselves of the facility. He concluded his remarks about the meeting with the Prime Minister by saying that, as of now, the National Front Club was not open and the Palace of Youth still had not come into existence and students were without a meeting place. While he hoped for a calm academic year, he nevertheless feared that the students would eventually become exercised over political issues, particularly elections, and that some political activity would result. Dr. Sanjabi also mentioned that the National Front had considerable support among the two upper classes of Tehran secondary schools.

All the people arrested at the time of the 30th of Tir demonstrations had been released with the exception, as far as the National Front was aware, of a few students and workers, according to Dr. Sanjabi. He said he had urged the Prime Minister at the meeting mentioned above to identify communists among those arrested. He said there would be no objection from anyone that such people remain under arrest. The government, however, had declined to provide the information, and the National Front was left to conclude that the handful of people who remained in prison represented the sum total of communists in the country (making all Iranians grateful that the total was so small) or that the government didn't know what it was talking about. Dr. Sanjabi said that he felt entitled to adopt the latter view.

Dr. Sanjabi said in passing that five younger members of his family, including his own son, are studying in the United States. Only one of these is engaged in political activity among Iranian students in the United States. He did not identify him but did make it clear that it was not his son.

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Secret

April 17, 1953

According [illegible] Ali Shayegan, prominent National Front [illegible] now in Europe. It was [illegible] suggested him to contact certain high-ranking [illegible] Paris, [illegible] Embassy and Embassy officer. Any further informa- [illegible] on Shayegan's trip would be [illegible].



AIR PRIORITY

FORM DS-682
6-1-50

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

# OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

TO: Department of State

Date: October 25, 1961

FROM: American Embassy, TEHRAN

OMM-22

SUBJECT: VISAS: Section 245 Case of Ali SHAYEGAN

REF: Embassy's OMM-19, October 11, 1961

The Embassy's source advises that it has no objection to the release of the information contained in the reference OMM to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

COMS/GuMagure/mmg

VISAS: Section 245 Case of Ali SHAYEGAN

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FORM DS-682
8-1-50

AIR PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

# OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

TO: Department of State — Date: October 11, 1961

FROM: American Embassy, TEHRAN — OMW-19

SUBJECT: VISAS: ADVISORY OPINIONS: SECURITY - Section 245 Cases of Ali SHAYEGAN (All 589 431) and Family

REF: CA-1468, Aug. 11, 1960, Embassy's OMW-89 of Jan. 21, 1958, and Department's reply thereto, OMW-11, of February 3, 1958

The Embassy has received the following CONFIDENTIAL report from its controlled American source concerning Mr. Ali Shayegan who, together with his wife, Badri Shaybani Shayegan and four children, Ahmad, Hamid, Maryan, and Layli, are applying for change of status to that of permanent residents at the office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 20 West Broadway, New York, New York:

"A source available to this office has given us the following information which may or may not pertain to your Subject:

"Dr. Seyed Ali Shayegan was one of the founders of the National Front Faction. The following can be deduced from an examination of his file:

'From the very beginning of his entry into politics the Subject displayed an inclination towards the out-lawed Tudeh Party and the political regime of the U.S.S.R. The Subject's activities during the period of his political life corroborate the above for he acted as a lawyer and solicitor for Iran Se Trans, which was a Russian Company, for a period of four years. He also acted as a lawyer for the Russian Embassy in Tehran. At the time when Dr. Fereidun KESHAVARZ (member of the Central Committee of the outlawed Tudeh Party) was the Minister of Education, Dr. Shayegan was Under Secretary to the Ministry and for some time he (Dr. Shayegan) was himself the Minister of Education. During the period when the Subject acted as Minister of Education he always strengthened Tudeh elements of the Ministry in all respects. In one of the Conferences in the year 1328 (1949) which was held in his own house he delivered a speech in which he said: "During the period that I was the Minister of Education I never allowed any violation of the rights of Tudeh elements. I refrained from complying with the instructions of GHAVAM-O-SALTANEH (the then Prime Minister of Iran) and the leaders of the Democrat Party to the effect that I should exert pressure upon Tudeh elements. With my own hand I wrote that this (exertion of pressure upon Tudeh elements) was impossible."

'In

VISAS: ADVISORY OPINIONS: SECURITY - Section 245 Cases of Ali SHAYEGAN (All 589 431) and Family

COMS/O:Rogers/mng

CONFIDENTIAL



★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 - 946948



'In the year 1327 (1948) and after the incident of the 15th of Bahman (4th February 1948) he acted as solicitor for a number of Tudeh elements in the Courts. At the time of commencement of the Parliamentary Elections of the year of 1328 (1949) he founded a political group under the title of "Fighter" the leaders of which were mostly members of the outlawed Tudeh Party.

'In the year 1330 (1951) he was invited by the Directors of the Peace Sympathizers Society to accept the leadership of the Society. He expressed his satisfaction to entertain the invitation. In one of the papers on file dated 1330 (1951) it is stated that the Subject is relied upon by the Russian authorities and that Tudeh elements would support only the Subject who was among the Iranian delegation who went to Hague. At the time of Dr. MOSSADEGH's premiership, the Subject and Dr. FATEMI (the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Dr. MOSSADEGH's Cabinet), who received capital punishment, supported the doctrines of Tudeh Elements and the freedom of action given to Tudeh elements at the time was to some extent the result of their measures.

'Moreover, the Subject was a member of the Eight-Man Committee and was the one who prepared the Eight-Man Project (a project to curtail the Royal Prerogative). Furthermore, the Subject participated in the enactment of all the laws which were ratified at the time of Dr. MOSSADEGH's Premiership. He also participated in the enactment of the Law of Political Division of the State at the time when Dr. SADIGHI was the Minister of Interior. The Subject was the main element who brought about the Referendum. He was the first speaker at the meeting of the afternoon of the 25th Mordad 1332 (16th August 1953) in the Baharestan Square. (The Iranian Lower House is situated in the Baharestan Square.) The Subject is an obstinate opposer of Monarchy and is the author of the famous statement: "Religions are undergoing transition, why Governments must not undergo evolution and change?" The Subject accompanied Dr. MOSSADEGH when the latter went to the International Tribunal of Hague. The Subject guided Dr. MOSSADEGH in his opposition against Monarchy and the Shah. The Subject's signature is the very beginning of other signatures reflected on the notorious communique of the 30th Tir (21 July 1952). After the incident of the 30th Tir he made a strongly-worded speech against the Court and the 16th Majlis. The Subject was one of the Ministers of the MOSSADEGH's Government. The Subject's giving a free hand to Tudeh elements during the latter part of MOSSADEGH's Premiership and his strengthening them brought the country to the verge of destruction. After the uprising of the 28th of Mordad 1332 (19 August 1953) the Subject was prosecuted for activities to destroy the fundamental foundations of the State and for instigating the people to become armed and fight against the Royal Prerogative. The Military Court of Review sentenced him to ten years imprisonment with labor and the verdict was affirmed.

'After

'After some period of imprisonment the Subject was pardoned by His Majesty the Shah and was released from prison. In 1336 (1957) the Subject applied for a passport to leave for Europe to receive medical treatment. His application was approved by His Majesty the Shah and he went to Europe.

'At the present the Subject acts as leader of those Iranians who are opposed to the Monarchy and are living in the United States. In co-operation with Saifpur FATEMI, brother to the Dr. FATEMI who received capital punishment, he has formed a group under the title of "Students of Free Iran" in the United States. The Subject is busy in insidious activities against Iran and the Royal Prerogative. The information available and which are mostly allegations on the part of the members of the National-Front indicate that the Subject is in contact with those at the helm of affairs in the United States Government.

'The Subject corresponds, and has other connections, with most of his former friends and colleagues and the leaders of the National-Front."

Although the above report states that it may or may not pertain to the person who is applying for change of status in the United States, the report itself leaves no doubt that it does concern this person. Dr. Shayegan was the Subject of the Embassy's request for an advisory opinion contained in its OMV-20 of January 21, 1958. The Department's reply thereto, OMV-11, February 3, 1958, stated that since the Consular Officer was satisfied the Mr. Shayegan was convicted of a purely political offense, the Department would have no objection to the issuance of a nonimmigrant visa "for the purposes of the present visit." The Department also instructed that should Mr. Shayegan again apply for a visa and in the event the pertinent court records should become available, the case should be submitted to the Department for an advisory opinion. Although the actual court records have not become available the above report introduces a security element into the case not previously known in view of Dr. Shayegan's close association with Tudeh elements during the years that he was an official of the Iranian Government and raises a serious question of ineligibility under Section 212(a)(28) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. It is the Consular Officer's opinion that Dr. Shayegan's various efforts in behalf of, and his support of Communist (Tudeh) elements in this country, as described in the report, constitutes "advocates" and/or "affiliation" as those terms are defined in Appendix A, 22 CFR 42.91(a)(28), Note 1, and, therefore he is ineligible to receive a visa or to change his status to that of a permanent resident under Section 212(a)(28) of the Act. In view of the last two paragraphs of the above report the Department may wish to investigate Dr. Shayegan's activities in the United States to determine whether he might be ineligible under Section 212(a)(27) in that his presence there may be prejudicial to the public interest, security, or welfare of the United States.

Dr. Shayegan





Dr. Shayegan was issued a B-2 Visitor's Visa on March 29, 1958. His wife and child, Layli, were issued B-2 visas on October 25, 1958, and his other children were issued F Student Visas on October 27, 1958, and accompanied their mother to the United States. On November 30, 1960, the Embassy received a request for clearance on Dr. Shayegan as he was applying for a visitor's visa in Montreal. Montreal was furnished with the information contained in the Embassy's OMV-20, of January 21, 1958, to the Department. Presumably his B-2 visa was revalidated although this office has not received a notification thereof. On June 6, 1961, the Embassy received a request for clearance on Badri Shayegan (wife of Dr. Shayegan) from the Embassy in Paris where she was applying for a visitor's visa. Paris was informed by telegram on the same date that Badri Shayegan had applied for change of status in the United States and, therefore, did not appear to qualify as a bona fide nonimmigrant. It is not known whether she has returned to the United States as this office has not received a notification of revalidation or issuance of a nonimmigrant visa to her from another Consular Office.

The Department's advisory opinion is requested in this case as it is believed that if the Immigration and Naturalization Service denies change of status to Dr. Shayegan he will apply for an immigrant visa abroad. Dr. Shayegan's Form I-483 has been returned to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, New York, with a note thereon to await CLASSIFIED material in accordance with instructions contained in CA-1468 regarding information containing third agency material. The Forms I-483 for Mrs. Shayegan and the children have also been returned with negative clearances.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | | | |
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| 1 | | | |
| TITLE OF CASE AND ALIASES: SHAYEGAN, Ali | | RELATING FILES: A-11589431 | G-22 LINE: |
| | | TYPE OF INVESTIGATION: Applicant for Admission - Subversive | |
| DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: March 3, 1903 - Shiraz Fars, Iran | DATE, PLACE, MANNER OF LAST ENTRY IN U.S.: May 26, 1958 - New York, N.Y. as B-2 visitor. | NATIONALITY: Iran | |
| OFFICE IN CHARGE OF INVESTIGATION: New York, New York | REPORT MADE AT: New York, New York | PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT: Feb.19,20,21;Mar.2,5,9,15,62 | |

SYNOPSIS

Investigation conducted pursuant to memorandum dated February 7, 1962 from the Applications Section, New York requesting investigation to determine whether any grounds of excludability can be developed based on subversive grounds or under Section 212(a)(27) in that the SUBJECT'S presence in the United States may be prejudicial to the public interest, security or welfare of the United States.

Other than derogatory information furnished by a source of NYC-I-230 all other Government agencies failed to furnish any derogatory information.

Witnesses furnished by the Foreign Address and Occupational Index, witnesses cognizant of Iranian affairs, and officials of the Iranian Consulate all failed to furnish any information of a derogatory nature.

SUBJECT in a sworn statement dated February 19, 1962 denied ever giving any support or sympathy to the Tudeh Party (Communist Party of Iran) while a member of the Iranian Parliament. He does not believe in the overthrow of government by force or violence and would like to see a constitutional monarchy established in Iran.

PENDING | PENDING INACTIVE | XX CLOSED | REFERRED TO CONTROL OFFICE

DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Applications Section, New York w/file A-11589431 and ex "A"
1 - FBI New York

REPORT MADE BY: Investigator
DATE: March 15,1962
Signature: Samuel K. Zaffery - VI
REVIEWED AND APPROVED
DATE
Signature
Title

INVESTIGATIVE REPORT PAGE SHEET
Form G-166 (Rev. 5-1-60)



DETAILS

Investigation conducted pursuant to memorandum dated February 7, 1962 from the Applications Section, New York requesting investigation to determine whether any grounds of excludability can be developed based on subversive grounds or under Section 212(a)(27) in that SUBJECT'S presence in the United States may be prejudicial to the public interest, security or welfare of the United States.

A review of file A-11589431 relating to the SUBJECT reflects that he was born in Shiraz Fars, Iran on March 3, 1903. He was admitted to the United States at New York, New York on May 26, 1958 as a B-2 visitor. His status was changed to that of an F-1 to teach Persian literature at the New School for Social Research at 66 West 12th Street, New York, New York. On Feb.27, 1961 the SUBJECT submitted an application for adjustment of status as a permanent resident under Section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

On October 17, 1961 the SUBJECT furnished a sworn statement to Immigrant Inspector ROBERT VISCONTI at which time he advised that he had been arrested in Iran on the charge that he, Prime Minister MOSSADEGH, Foreign Minister FATEMI and other members of Parliament were planning to overthrow the regime of the Shah and found the republic. A trial was held in Teheran in 1954 and as a result he was imprisoned for three years. The SUBJECT denied that he ever inspired the overthrow of the Government of the Shah but rather proposed a motion of articles to define the respective rights of the Shah and the Parliament and to lessen the dictatorial powers of the Shah. The SUBJECT denied that he was ever a member of the Communist Party and favors a constitutional form of government.

NYC-I-230 by memorandum dated November 7, 1961 furnished information from an overseas source advising that the SUBJECT was one of the founders of the National Front Faction. At the very beginning of the SUBJECT'S entry into politics he displayed an inclination towards the outlawed Tudeh Party and the political regime of the USSR. During the period when the SUBJECT acted as Minister of Education he always strengthened Tudeh elements of the Ministry in all respects. Also at the time of Dr. MOSSADEGH'S premiership, the SUBJECT and Dr. FATEMI, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, supported the doctrines of the Tudeh elements. The SUBJECT was a member of the 8-man committee and one who prepared a project to curtail the royal prerogative. The SUBJECT is an obstinate opposer of the monarchy and is the author of the famous statement: "Religions are undergoing transition, why governments must not undergo evolution and change"? The SUBJECT accompanied Dr. MOSSADEGH when the latter went to the International Tribunal of Hague. The SUBJECT guided Dr. MOSSADEGH in his opposition against the

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53

monarchy and the Shah. After the uprising of August 19, 1935 the SUBJECT was prosecuted for activities to destroy the fundamental foundations of the state and for instigating the people to become armed and fight against the royal prerogative. The Military Court of Review sentenced him to 10 years in prison and the verdict was affirmed. After some period of imprisonment the SUBJECT was pardoned by the Shah and was released from prison. In 1957 SUBJECT applied for a passport to leave for Europe for medical treatment. His application was approved by the Shah and he went to Europe. At present, SUBJECT acts as leader of those Iranians who are opposed to the Monarchy and are living in the United States. The SUBJECT is busy in activities against Iran and the royal prerogative.

NYC-I-230 advised on February 3, 1958 that since the Consular Officer was satisfied that the SUBJECT was convicted of a purely political offense they would have no objection to the issuance of a non-immigrant visa.

All other government agencies failed to furnish any derogatory information.

On February 20, 1962 KAMRAN SALOUR, A-11[illegible]7651, residing at 33-44 Ft. Independence Street, New York, New York was interviewed at his place of employment, Gift Craft Leather Company, 7 West 22nd Street, New York, New York. He advised that he was a former member of an anti-communist student association in Teheran. He was severely injured by communist supporters during a demonstration in Iran. He was also an employee of the Finance Department of the Iranian Government. He did not know the SUBJECT personally in Iran but to the best of his knowledge the SUBJECT was never sympathetic to the Tudeh Party. The SUBJECT always had the reputation of being anti-communist. The SUBJECT favored a limitation to the Shah's power and favored a constitutional monarchy with the Shah as a figurehead similarly to the types of government that exist in England and the Scandinavian countries. The SUBJECT is known throughout Iran as an extremely democratic individual who fought against the dictatorial methods of the Shah. The National front organization of which the SUBJECT is a member is a democratic organization whose avowed purpose is to limit the Shah's power and establish democracy in Iran. The witness never heard any statements that the SUBJECT ever sympathized with the Tudeh Party and in fact was known in Iran to be against the communist elements in that country.

On February 21, 1962 ALI MOHAMMAD FATMI, A-10136079, residing at 62-60 99th Street, Rego Park, L.I., New York was interviewed at this office. He advised that he has known the SUBJECT for approximately 15 years. The witness is the President of the Iranian Students Association of the United States and is one of the directors of the Confederation of Iranian Students which has 22,000 members in the United States, Europe and Iran. SUBJECT is extremely well known both in Iran and abroad as the former Minister of Education and majority leader of Parliament in Iran. The witness further

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advised that the Tudeh Party (Communist Party of Iran) was outlawed in 1949. The SUBJECT was attacked by the "Besoye Ayndeh" which is the official front publication of the Tudeh Party in Iran because of the SUBJECT'S leadership in promulgating the "National Security Act" which enforced legislation against the Tudeh Party. In July 1952 AVRIL HARRIMAN, the representative of President Truman, was in Iran negotiating with the SUBJECT who represented Premier MOSSADEGH in connection with some oil negotiations. The Tudeh Party created a violent demonstration HARRIMAN in which numerous people were killed. In order to stop these demonstrations the "National Security Act" was passed by the MOSSADEGH Government to prevent reoccurrence of these types of disorders. As a result of the passage of the "National Security Act" about 100 members of the Tudeh Party including most of the leaders were exiled to an island in the Persian Gulf and kept under strict surveillance. The SUBJECT was the guiding force behind the passage of this National Security Act. As a result of the passage of this National Security Act the SUBJECT was violently attacked by Tudeh elements as a stooge of American imperialism, a Fascist, etc.

The witness further stated that when the SUBJECT was majority leader in Parliament, the Tudeh continually attacked the SUBJECT'S activities. The SUBJECT as a majority leader in Parliament represented Premier MOSSADEGH in negotiating with different American teams who were sent by the President of the United States to arrange certain oil transactions. The Tudeh elements were opposed to such negotiations and were pressing the idea that the Americans had no right to be involved in these matters and the SUBJECT and other government officials were betraying the government by allowing these negotiations to continue. The SUBJECT was also attacked for not favoring a coalition between Tudeh elements and the national front. The witness heard the SUBJECT in his last public speech on August 16, 1953 state that Red imperialism was as much a danger to Iran as British imperialism and he was again attacked because of his view by the Tudeh elements for his anti-communist views. The SUBJECT was the Dean and Member of the Faculty of the College of Law at Teheran University. During the period the Tudeh elements were strong at the university and always disliked the SUBJECT'S independent attitude in not going along with other members of the faculty who were then expressing pro-leftist opinions. Many of the present judges and attorneys of Iran are the SUBJECT'S former students and can recall his criticism of the Tudeh Party when they were advocating oil concessions for the USSR in the Northern provinces of Iran.

The witness also stated that since the Coup D'Etat in 1953, the SUBJECT has become, in essence, the leader of the National Front Organization. The National Front is a four party coalition in Iran, desiring that Iran shall remain independent and the Constitution of 1906 shall be enforced. They also advocate that the corrupt elements should be removed from the government and that free representative government shall be instituted.

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A-11589431

Since 1951 the Tudeh Party has always tried to gain respectability by attempting to join the National Front Organization and has been pushing the idea of a united front. The SUBJECT, among other leaders of the National Front, have resisted the pressure of the Tudeh and on many occasions has gone on record as saying that the National Front is a nationalistic movement inspired by the ideals and interests of the Iranian Government. It has nothing in common with the Tudeh and International Communism. Another strong point made by the SUBJECT was that the Tudeh elements are internationalizing the Iranian situation for trying to sacrifice the interests of the Iranian people for the cause of communism. The National Front cannot allow such exploitations of the Iranian people by the Tudeh elements. The witness stated the SUBJECT has made many speeches in the United States the last being in December 1961. In the witness' opinion the SUBJECT would like to see a return to a monarchy as prescribed in the 1906 Constitution rather than the dictatorial monarchy which is now in existence. The witness stated that in his opinion the SUBJECT, because of his past record and long association with Dr. MOSSADEGH plus the spending of his formative years in France and obtaining of his education in Western Europe is opposed to any overthrow of government by violence, coercion, political assassination and such. The witness believes from the SUBJECT'S speeches, his books and the information obtained from the SUBJECT'S former students he believes that the SUBJECT is deeply committed to democratic institutions and believes that any change in government should come by peaceful and legitimate means.

On March 5, 1962 the reporting officer accompanied by Assistant Chief LLOYD MATHEW interviewed the following individuals at the offices of the Iranian Consulate, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York.

MASSOUD DJAHANBANI, Consul General of Iran, advised that he was a former student of the SUBJECT while at the College of Law, Teheran University. The MOSSADEGH Government was never in anyway suspected of being sympathetic to the communists or being leftist in any manner. The SUBJECT as majority leader in the MOSSADEGH Parliament never conducted himself in any manner which would indicate a sympathy for the Tudeh Party. In fact in the SUBJECT'S political activities he was in opposition to the Tudeh elements in Iran. However since the Coup D'Etat in 1953 the Consul General knows that the SUBJECT is in opposition to the Shah and is continuing to work against the Shah by his activities with the National Front Organization. The Consul General further advised that although he knows the SUBJECT is in opposition to the present government in Iran he does not have any knowledge that the SUBJECT has ever been sympathetic to the ideals of communism.

MANSOOR MESBAHI-FOOSHI, Vice Consul of Iran, advised that he has known the SUBJECT for approximately 15 years. The SUBJECT is an extremely religious individual and has always manifested an opposition to communism. The Vice Consul was formerly the SUBJECT'S student while attending the College of

New York, N.Y. 3-15-62
A-11589431



Law at Teheran University. During his attendance at the University the Vice Consul noted that the SUBJECT was always in opposition to those students who favored communist ideology. The Vice Consul had no knowledge that the SUBJECT was ever in sympathy to the Tudeh elements in Iran and in fact the SUBJECT was known to be opposed to the Tudeh while in Parliament.

[redacted], Vice Consul at Iran, advised that he has known the SUBJECT from 1951 and was formerly a student at the College of Law, Teheran University where the SUBJECT was one of his professors. He also was of the opinion [redacted] the SUBJECT was never in sympathy to the Tudeh elements in [redacted] the SUBJECT'S actions while a member of Parliament were always against the Tudeh Party. The MOSSADEGH Government was never in anyway leftist or pro-communist but rather was nationalistic in its views and wanted to reduce the power of the Shah.

On February 23, 1962 the Foreign Address and Occupational Index furnished the names of individuals who may possibly know the SUBJECT. On March 9, 1962 Investigator DOUGLAS KELLY interviewed AMIR ASSAD BAKHTIARI at 54 Harrison Street, Staten Island, New York. The witness stated that he knows the SUBJECT only by reputation and that he was a professor of law and taught literature and languages. He was also a member of the Parliament in Iran during the MOSSADEGH regime. The SUBJECT had a reputation of being in opposition to the Shah.

On March 9, 1962 AMIR TAJ-MINIEH, A-11058683 was interviewed by Investigator DOUGLAS KELLY at 377 Sleight Avenue, Staten Island, New York at which time he failed to furnish any pertinent information regarding the SUBJECT.

Investigation conducted to interview ASMAIL FAIAZ and MANSOUR LOTFI reflected that their present whereabouts are unknown.

The SUBJECT appeared at this office on February 19, 1962 and executed a sworn statement which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". He advised that he presently resides at 85 Davenport Avenue, New Rochelle, New York. He is presently a teacher of Persian and Persian Literature at the New School for Social Research at 66 West 12th Street, New York City. His wife and two sons are also in the United States. One son is attending Bard College in New York and the other is at St. Thomas College in St. Paul, Minnesota. He was formerly a Professor of Civil Law at the University of Teheran from 1935 to 1937. He was a Councellor at the Ministry of Finance from 1935 to 1937; from 1946 to 1947 he was Minister of Education and from 1949 to 1953 was a member of the Iranian Parliament. In 1953 he together with Prime Minister MOSSADEGH and other members of the Iranian Government were arrested by the Shah and charged with conspiracy to overthrow the government. He received a sentence of [redacted] in prison but his sentence was reduced to 3 years and he was released.

on "A"

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He further stated that while he was in the Iranian Parliament the Tudeh Party was outlawed and they attacked the present government as being imperialists and pro-American. While he was a member of the Iranian Parliament he helped promulgate a law against revolutionaries or anyone who wanted to disturb the government and this in fact effected the Tudeh Party. The name of the law was "National Security Law". He never gave any aid or sympathy to the Tudeh elements in Iran. He stated that the basis for the charges pressed against him and the Prime Minister, MOSSADEGH, in 1953, was that they were going to try to change the regime from a monarchy to a republic. The Communist Party was outlawed and it would have been very useful for the government to try to convict the SUBJECT and MOSSADEGH as communists but the government did not have the slightest evidence to prove that MOSSADEGH or the SUBJECT were communists. On the contrary, MOSSADEGH and the SUBJECT always struggled against communism. The SUBJECT further stated that he was a member of the National Front and is still a member. The principles of the National Front are for the establishment of a democracy and a constitutional monarchy. The National Front does in no way favor communist ideology. He does not believe in the overthrow of government by force or violence and his training and upbringing has always indicated that change should be through legislation. The SUBJECT denied that he was ever a member of the Communist Party or was ever a sympathizer to their movement. He also completely denied he ever supported the Tudeh elements in Iran. He does admit that he is in opposition to the Shah but has formed no organization to fight against the Iranian Government.

A neighborhood and employment investigation has been conducted on the dates and at the places indicated below and all persons interviewed advised the SUBJECT is a person of good moral character and reputation and nothing of an adverse nature was reflected bearing on the SUBJECT'S loyalty. All persons interviewed further advised that the SUBJECT never indicated any sympathy for communism.

On February 21, 1962 WILLIAM BIRENBAUM, Dean, New School for Social Research, 66 West 12th Street, New York City advised that he has known the SUBJECT from October 1961 to date.

On February 21, 1962 MIRRA KOSENBERG, Supervisor, Dean's Office, New School for Social Research, 66 West 12th St., New York City advised that she has known the SUBJECT from Sept. 1959 to date.

On March 9, 1962 ELINOR BATHER, Foreign Students Advisor, New School for Social Research, 66 West 12th Street, New York City was interviewed at 51 5th Avenue, New York City at which time she advised that she has known the SUBJECT from June 1959 to date.

On March 9, 1962 Mrs. G. WOOD, neighbor, 25 Davenport Avenue, New Rochelle,



New York advised that she has known the SUBJECT from 1959 to date.

On March 9, 1962 J.P. NORTON, neighbor, 25 Davenport Ave., New Rochelle, New York advised that he has known the SUBJECT from 1960 to date.

On March 9, 1962 F. OHLES, neighbor, 25 Davenport Ave., New Rochelle, New York advised that he has known the SUBJECT from 1960 todate.

On March 9, 1962 H. BRENHOFF, neighbor, 25 Davenport Ave., New Rochelle, New York advised that he has known the SUBJECT from 1959 to date.

On March 9, 1962 J. ROSENFELD, neighbor, 25 Davenport Ave., New Rochelle, New York advised that he has known the SUBJECT from 1960 to date.

On March 9, 1962 H. N. STERNBERG, neighbor, 25 Davenport Ave., New Rochelle, New York advised that he has known the SUBJECT from 1959 to date.

FORM DS-682
8-1-50

AIR PRIORITY

SECRET

Copy 1 of 7 Copies, Series A
Page 1 of 12 Pages

# OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

TO: Department of State (VO)

Date: July 12, 1962

FROM: American Embassy, TEHRAN

CMV-8

SUBJECT: VISAS: Section 245 Case of Dr. Ali SHAYEGAN

REF: Department's CMV-43 of May 4, 1962 and Embassy's CMV-22, October 25, 1961

Another exhaustive investigation has been made in this case and the Embassy has now been furnished with the following report from its Controlled American Source. The attachments to this report are also quoted below. The Embassy's Controlled American Source has no objection to the release of this material to the Immigration and Naturalization Service for questioning Dr. Shayegan except that the restriction under "Comment" at the end of Item 3 must be observed and the sources mentioned in the report and its attachments must not be revealed.

SHAYEGAN, Ali

"1. Attached is correspondence indicating the following:

a. Subject worked under a Tudeh Party Minister of Education as Under-Secretary of Education. Keshavarz was a well known Tudeh Party member and is now resident in Geneva.

b. Shayegan signed the Stockholm Peace Appeal.

c. Shayegan is considered to lean towards Marxist social philosophies.

d. A suspicious connection of Dr. Shayegan with the Soviet Insurance Company, as its attorney. (Comment: This connection is not amplified.)

e. A charge that Shayegan had been Iranian legal advisor to the Soviet Commercial Attache. (Comment: Dr. Shayegan's exact position with the official Soviet establishment in Tehran is not clear.)

"2. This office is considerably hampered by the retirement of files. However the following classified document numbers cited should be available in Washington, and they contain the following charges:

a. Persian delegate to the Second World Peace Congress. To leave shortly: Foreign Broadcast Information Service #222, 14 November 1950 (Moscow)

b.

COMS/CMMeyers/mmg

SECRET



★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1951—893427



b. Trial will begin soon in Supreme Criminal Court for Tudeh activities. CS-W-15254, 15 November 1950.

c. Subject reelected a director of Iranian Peace Partisans at a meeting at the home of Bahar, 10 November 1950. CS-W-16963, February 1951.

d. Subject will defend certain Tudeh Party members convicted in connection with the attempt on the Shah's life. RIT 231, 4 March 1949.

e. National Front Majlis member and a member of the Soviet sponsored peace movement. SO 65462, 6 June 1951.

f. Subject and colleagues have established a club, best described as a "circle of intellectuals", which may develop into a left-wing political party. SO 65864, 12 June 1951.

g. Subject and Mariman (deceased 1961) in contact with the Soviets. SO 75409.

h. Subject attended the World Court Session with Hasan Sadr, a Tudeh Party member. (Comment: One cannot blame a person for line of duty work if he is associated with a Communist.) WBL 24,215, 8 January 1952.

i. Subject reputedly was or still is on a 14,000 rial retainer as lawyer for Iran Sovtrans. TEHE 236, 15 October 1952. (Comment: Subject's exact job with the official Soviet complex in Tehran is not known.)

j. Subject favors Tudeh Party's role in a coalition government in order to appease recalcitrant groups, according to a member of the Tudeh Party. CS-2192, 16 February 1953.

k. Subject, an adviser of Prime Minister Mossadeq, stated Iranians he met during his trip in Europe were extremely critical of Mossadeq's attitude toward the oil question and of his "toleration" of the Tudeh Party. Mossadeq was impressed by this statement and questioned subject at length concerning the attitude of the European press toward Mossadeq and Iran. CS-12695, 17 June 1953.

l. Subject is a leader of the National Front. Tudeh sympathizer. Report states that his supporters in the University plan to have a strike in a pro-Mossadeq movement. Secret Police Report - 13 September 1953.

m.

SECRET

m. According to captured minutes of a meeting of 16 August 1953, subject was sent by Mossadeq to the Tudeh Party to tell them Mossadeq agreed that a republic should be formed in Iran. (Comment: According to the Military Government of that period this was a meeting with the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party. CAS research indicated that the meeting more probably was with the Central Council of the National Society for Struggle against Imperialism.)

n. Subject was a noted personality in the Striving Teachers' Union formed in 1950 and reportedly was non-Tudeh. The Tudeh Party backed him in the 17th Majlis election. (NIT-891, 7 December 1954.)

"3. A usually reliable source, who served with Dr. Ali Shayegan in former Prime Minister Mossadeq's cabinet, stated on 26 June 1962 that he knew that Dr. Shayegan worked for the Soviet Embassy as a legal advisor. This source stated that he had heard that Dr. Shayegan was paid Rials 20,000 per month for this work. This source stated that he did not think that Dr. Shayegan was pro-Soviet because of this work for the Soviet Embassy and he did not believe that Dr. Shayegan had been or was now a member of the Tudeh Party. Basically Dr. Shayegan was a wealthy man and opposed to any leveling of wealth advocated by the Communists. The source reported that Dr. Shayegan was very much opposed to this Shah but was not necessarily opposed to the concept of monarchy if the Shah would reign and not rule. (Comment: No indication of the source description may be revealed to any foreigner as this information must remain secret.)

"4. SAVAK in Tehran has repeatedly requested that the United States Government move against Dr. Ali Shayegan and expell him from the United States. It is stated that this action would impress the nationalist students, who oppose the Shah and government of Iran, resident in the United States. SAVAK has been asked to furnish proof to the United States Government of subject's Tudeh (Communist) Party activities. SAVAK has only furnished the report on which Mr. Colombo's report was based.

"5. The material in paragraphs 2 and 3, above, is furnished so that subject may be questioned in an effort to develop concrete information on any relationship with the Tudeh Party.

This office believes that if it can be proven that Dr. Shayegan worked for the Tudeh Party he should be expelled from the United States immediately. On the other hand, while sympathetic to the embarrassment the student demonstrations against Government of Iran officials cause the Government of Iran, it is believed that the expulsion of Dr. Shayegan will do little to lessen the violence or frequency of such demonstrations. The only long term solution to the problem is for the Government of Iran to merit through deeds the respect of students everywhere and thus to make them again a positive segment of Iranian society. Anti-Tudeh Party and pro-American nationalist leaders in Iran and abroad are not convinced that Dr. Shayegan has a Tudeh Party background and it is believed that it is in the interests of the United States Government to have conclusive evidence prior to taking executive action against Dr. Shayegan. Expulsion of Dr. Shayegan on politically motivated charges will be followed





followed by politically motivated charges against other opposition leaders and any gratitude from the Government of Iran gained in the expulsion of Dr. Shayegan will be eaten by the disappointment that other nationalist leaders are not also expelled. As a nationalist leader, it is believed that subject is long on words and age but short on courage and organizational ability."

Attachment No. 1 "CONFIDENTIAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA
Report Prepared on November 20, 1950

*Name SHAYEGAN Seyed Ali

Nationality Iranian Title, if any Doctor of Law

Date and place of birth 1900, Shiraz

Position Deputy to 16th Majlis Date appointed October 1949

Party affiliations National Front

Previous career See below

Languages spoken Persian, French

Attitude toward and service in the United States See "Remarks"

Family details Married - Two children

REMARKS: (Should present a brief word picture of the individual, including race, religion, fraternal affiliations, education, reputation, personality, influence, attitude toward other nations, etc.)

Education: Preliminary education at Shiraz.
School of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran.
Doctorate in Law, France.

Career: Professor of Law, University of Tehran.
Legal Adviser, Ministry of Finance.
Practicing Lawyer.

1946-1948: Assistant Dean, School of Law, Tehran University.
Jan 1946: Ministry of Education, Under-Secretary.
Oct 1946: Minister of Education, Qavam's cabinet.
June 1947: Member, High Council of Education.
Oct 1947: Deputy to 15th Majlis from Tehran.
Oct 1949: Deputy to 16th Majlis from Tehran, member of Education Committee, member of National Front.

Publications:

Publications: "The Law of Civilization" (Editor)
Articles in Keyhan newspaper

Remarks: After concluding his studies at the University of Tehran, Dr. Shayegan was sent to France by the Iranian government to complete his higher education, and there received the degree of Doctor of Law. Upon his return to Tehran, he was appointed Professor of Law at the University. He later became Assistant Dean of the Law School, but resigned when Dr. Issa Sadeq, then Minister of Education, appointed Mansur-ul-Sultaneh Adl to the deanship. In 1946, he became Under-Secretary of Education, working under Malike Shoarayi Bahar and Kashavarz successively. When Qavam formed his coalition cabinet in October 1946, Shayegan, who was at the time a leading member of the Iran Party, was made Minister of Education. As a deputy to the 16th Majlis, his friendship with Dr. Saleh — an associate in the Iran Party — and his interest in free elections — Dr. Mossadeq's chief concern — prompted him to affiliate with the National Front.

Dr. Shayegan is generally considered to lean towards Marxist social philosophies. On the other hand, while Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Education, he refused to be party to the leftist manoeuvers of either Bahar or Kashavarz, and opposed their policies frequently and violently. Later, as Minister of Education, his principal efforts were to purge the Ministry of the Tudeh elements brought in by Kashavarz. During the trial of Tudeh leaders in 1949, he served on the Board of Defense for the Tudeh Party, but this action is not ascribed to pro-Soviet leanings. His own explanation is that the trial was illegal, because it took place under martial law, while the Tudeh members' crimes occurred before martial law was invoked; it is generally agreed, however, that he took the defense mainly because of the opportunity it afforded to build up his legal reputation. It has been reported that he may represent Iran at the rally in Poland of signers of the Stockholm Peace Petition.

While his attitude toward the Soviet Union and Communism is thus equivocal, Dr. Shayegan never wavers in his animosity toward England and the AIOC, which, in his opinion, control the Iranian government. Hatred of all things British is perhaps his strongest tie with the National Front. Toward America, Shayegan is not so violently hostile — but like his colleagues, he is vocally resentful of what he terms U. S. "intervention", and he has published frequent articles expressing his disapproval of the employment of foreign advisers.

In addition to serving as Majlis deputy, Dr. Shayegan has maintained an active law practice and has continued teaching at the University, where he is one of the most respected members of the faculty. A recent illness has made him decreasingly active, however, and he is presently in England for a serious surgical operation.

Dr. Shayegan is known for his energy, integrity, and affection nature — and also for a fiery temper and a touch of professorial absent-mindedness.

Prepared by: Mary R. Farrish
Research Assistant

CONFIDENTIAL"





Attachment No. 2 SECRET BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH
Prepared on October 5, 1951

"SHAYEGAN, Ali (Dr.)

Dr. Ali Shayegan, member of the Joint Oil Commission and of Prime Minister Mossadeq's mission to New York, is a prominent Iranian intellectual, a lawyer and educator of considerable reputation in Iran, and a dabbler in left-wing intellectual movements.

Born at Shiraz in 1900, he was educated at the Universities of Tehran and Paris, received a doctorate of law, and speaks French and Persian. He was a professor of Law at the University of Tehran for a number of years and became Assistant Dean of the Law School in 1946. In that year he also entered politics, first as Under Secretary and later as Minister of Education. He has served as deputy to the Majlis since 1947, but has continued the private practice of law and his teaching together with his political career.

Dr. Shayegan is bitterly anti-British, and has ascribed all of Iran's ills to the wickedness of the British Government and to AIOC. Hatred of all things British is his strongest tie with Dr. Mossadeq and the National Front. In July 1951, Mossadeq sent Shayegan to act as Iranian observer at the Court of International Justice at the Hague, which was holding hearings on the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute. Shayegan denounced the judges and accused them of partiality for Britain. Towards the United States, Shayegan is not hostile, but he is resentful of what he terms American "intervention" in Iranian affairs. He is generally considered to lean towards Marxist social philosophies, and he is known to have signed the Stockholm Peace Appeal.

BS-106
October 5, 1951"

Attachment No. 3 SECRET Despatch No. 911, May 5, 1953 from Tehran to Dept.

"FROM: AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

"TO The Department of State, Washington

"REFERENCES: Department Airgram A-1935, April 17, 1953, Control No. 2472; Embassy's CRD, November 20, 1950, and Supplement, October 7, 1952

"SUBJECT: Trip of Dr. Ali SHAYEGAN to Europe

"Before Dr. Ali Shayegan left for Europe on March 22 he had been in ill health for a long period, suffering from a serious stomach disorder for which he had been operated some time ago. He was so ill prior to his departure for medical treatment in Germany

in Germany that, as is personally known to the Embassy, for several days he was in bed and, under his doctor's orders, was not allowed to have visitors even at the time of No Ruz, the Iranian New Year.

"The Embassy has no reason to believe that there was any other purpose in Dr. Shayegan's trip to Europe than personal medical treatment. It might be borne in mind that Dr. Shayegan, being a leading supporter of Dr. Mosadeq, was the target of allegations after his departure by the opposition press, which tried to discredit the Government by declaring that Dr. Shayegan would meet Iranian communist elements in Europe.

"If the medical treatment given Dr. Shayegan is helpful, he may meet various Iranians in Europe, and the Embassy would, of course, appreciate any information which may become available concerning such contacts.

"For the Ambassador:

Copy pouched to
Amembassy, Paris

Roy M. Melbourne
First Secretary of Embassy."

Attachment No. 4 Copy of Department's SECRET A-1935 of April 17, 1953

"American Embassy PARIS A-1935 April 17, 1953

"American Embassy TEHRAN

"According CAS report Ali Shayegan, prominent National Front deputy in Majlis and confidant of Mosadeq, now in Europe. It was further stated Mosadeq requested him to contact certain high-ranking Tudeh and Kajar (or Qajar, former ruling dynasty) exiles in Paris, especially Iraj Eskandari and Rokneddin Kajar. Any further information available in Paris or Tehran on Shayegan's trip would be appreciated.

DULLES"

Attachment No. 5 CONFIDENTIAL Copy of Statement by Source, Habib Nafisi, June 9, 1953

"Dr. Seyid Ali SHAYEGAN. He is well educated, but at the same time he is uncertain in his political convictions as shown by his past willingness to work with a Tudeh Minister of Education. He at one time made every effort to get close to Qavam and then left him when his star fell. He joined Dr. Mosadeq's National Front drive and continues to play very close with the Iran Party, although not a formal member, "since this is the only political organization that will have him at the moment"."





"At present, he heads the Iranians in America who are against the Monarchy regime, and assisted by Saifpur Fatemi, brother of the executed Dr. Fatemi, he founded the Free Iran Students Organization and is engaged in harmful activity against the country and the Crown. The information on National Front rumors state that he is in touch with the American authorities.

"Dr. Shayegan is connected and corresponds with most of his old friends and colleagues and the National Front leaders.

"The above was submitted for your information. Please send a reply to the American Embassy's inquiry with due regard to the foregoing.

Prepared by: Aratarour
Sgd.
13 April 1961"

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While none of the above documents establish that Dr. Shayegan was actually a member of the Tudeh Party (Communist Party of Iran) they do state that he supported the leadership of the Peace Partisans (aka Peace Committee, Peace Appeal, Partisans for Peace, Peace Sympathizers Society) in 1951, that he signed the Stockholm Peace Appeal and that he was the Persian delegate to the Second World Peace Congress in Moscow in 1950. Even though Dr. Shayegan refuses to admit that he supported Tudeh elements in this country or that he was a member of the Tudeh Party, it would seem that the above activities would render him ineligible under Section 212(a)(28) of the Act, and it is felt that the Immigration and Naturalization Service should question him on these points. Although his connection with the Peace Partisans was mentioned in the report quoted in the Embassy's CMV-22 of October 25, 1961, as far as can be determined from that Service's report of interrogation attached to the Department's CMV-43 of May 4, 1962, he was not questioned in this regard. This may be due to the fact that the report referred to this organization as the Peace Sympathizer's Society but it is the same organization that is known variously as Peace Committee, Peace Appeal, Peace Partisans, and Partisans for Peace which is listed in Appendix A, Part IV, Exhibit I, under the name JAMIYYAT-E-TARAFDARAN-E-SOLH (Partisans of Peace Society) as a Communist-front organization.

A description of that organization, which was recently furnished by the Embassy's Controlled American Source, is quoted below:

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"Peace Committee or Peace Appeal

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 5 April 1962, subject as above. The subject, as listed, is not very specific, but the following may be of some assistance.

2. The Partisans of Peace Society (Jamiyyat-e-Tarafdaran-eSolh) which is sometimes

"Jobs Held: Vice-President of the Law Faculty and a barrister in 1940; counselor to the Ministry of Finance; member of the Education High Council; member of the University High Council; member of the Joint Oil Committee; member of the Eviction Committee; 16th and 17th Majlis; lawyer and legal advisor to Iransovtrans and the Fisheries, which were under the Soviets at that time, from 1943 to 1947; lawyer to the Soviet Embassy defending the said Embassy's claims in Iran's court of justice; presently, professor of International Law at an American university.

"Political Background: Dr. Shayegan was one of the founders of the National Front, but his dossier shows that he has ever since involving in politics been sympathizing with the Tudeh Party and the Soviets. His action also confirms this, for he has acted as lawyer to the Iransovtrans, a Soviet agency, for four years, and also to the Soviet Embassy for a time. When Dr. Feridun Keshavarz, member of the Tudeh Central Committee, was minister of Education, Dr. Shayegan was his assistant. Dr. Shayegan has assumed charge of the Ministry of Education for a time and upheld the Tudeh elements in that ministry while he held the position. In a meeting at his residence in 1949, he said: "When I was Minister of Education, I never allowed any harm to be done the Tudehites. I was pressed by Qavam-Saltaneh and other leaders of the Democratic Party to put the Tudehites under pressure, but I resisted and did not carry out their instructions."

"Following the attempt on the Shah's life in 1949, he acted as lawyer to the Tudeh elements. He founded the Strugglers Society when general elections were held in 1949, and old Tudehites made most of the Society's leaders. According to an information received from America 1951, Dr. Shayegan contacted the Soviet diplomats in America and assured them of his sympathies with the Tudeh Party of Iran.

"In 1951, he was offered the leadership of the Peace Partisans in 1951, and he accepted the position. Another report in 1951 stated that Dr. Shayegan was trusted by the Soviet authorities and that the Tudeh Party upheld only Dr. Shayegan out of the mission to the Hague. He and Dr. Fatemi (executed) upheld the Tudeh Party when Mosadeq was in office. Mr. Shayegan was a member of the 8-man Committee and drafted the resolution uphold by this committee. He had a hand in drafting all the laws made by Dr. Mosadeq and the law of provincial division sponsored by Dr. Sadiqi, who was the Minister of Interior at that time. The referendum was mainly his idea and he was the first speaker of the meeting held in the afternoon of 16 August 1953 on Baharistan Square. He is stubbornly anti-monarchist, and the well-known sentence "Orient is undergoing changes, why shouldn't the governments" is his.

"He accompanied Mosadeq to the Court of Justice at the Hague, and guided Mosadeq in his anti-monarchist and anti-Shah activity. He is the first man to have signed the 21 July statement. He made a strong speech against the Imperial Court and the 16th Majlis following the 21 July events. Dr. Shayegan was one of the ministers in Mosadeq's cabinet and gave the Tudeh member a free hand. Following the national upheavals of August 19, he was tried for having advocated the overthrow of regime and persuading the public to take arms against the Monarch, and was sentenced to 10 years labour imprisonment. He was afterwards pardoned by the Shah and set free. In 1957, he got a passport to travel to Europe, allegedly for medical treatment, and he left Iran after his request had met with the Shah's approval.





Attachment No. 6 CONFIDENTIAL Memorandum of Conversation, dated July 6, 1953

"In my conversation with Mustafa FATEH on July 3, he called to my attention a series of articles on Iran appearing in a United States newspaper which he believes to be the Washington Star. The articles were written by one VASILIY, a former member of the Soviet Embassy here, purporting to describe the activities of SADCHIKOV over the last few years. They have been translated and published in the newspaper Ateah. Names of important Iranians closely associated with the Soviet Embassy are not given in the translations although the editor parenthetically remarks that these names are given in full in the original. The names appear only as initials in the translations. One such is mentioned as Dr. S. which Fateh believes to be SHAYEGAN. In that connection, Fateh recalled Shayegan's suspicious connection with the Soviet Insurance Co., as its attorney, and stated he had other reasons to believe him a Soviet agent. He related that at the time Harriman was in Iran (the summer of 1951), he (Fateh) told the British Charge Middleton of his suspicions. Several months later when asked whether those suspicions had been checked, Middleton allegedly replied that investigation had proven the suspicions correct. Fateh added that according to his information Shayegan's connection with the Soviet Embassy is direct and not through the Tudeh Party or any of its front groups.

"The articles mention two others close to Shayegan who are also associated with the Soviet Embassy which Fateh believes to be HASSIBI and SANJABI. Several generals are also mentioned but Fateh was unable to identify them."

Attachment No. 7 CONFIDENTIAL Copy of a Statement dated October 1953

"SHAYEGAN, Dr.

"Mohsen Gharagozlu said Shayegan had been Iranian legal advisor to Soviet Commercial Attache or commercial trading firm until recent weeks."

Attachment No. 8 Copy of SECRET Report Prepared by SAVAK, dated April 13, 1961.

"Report on Dr. Seyed Ali Shayegan

"Purpose: The Security Section of the American Embassy has asked for information on him.

"Description: Dr. Seyed Ali Shayegan, son of Haj Seyed Hashem Mowla, born 1902.

"Education: He attended the Shari'at and Shafaieh elementary schools at Shiraz. He also attended two years of secondary education there and after having studied Farsi and Arabic literature for some time, he came to Tehran and attended first the Darolfonun and then the Political School. Having become a licenciate, he was sent to Paris by the government and he studied Law there. He returned to Tehran in 1933 and was employed as professor of the Tehran University.

"Jobs

sometimes called the Iranian League of Peace Partisans (Jamiyyat-e-Iran-ye Havadaran-e Solh) continues to be represented on the World Peace Council by Ali Bemorg Alavi, a Tudeh Central Committee member. Other Iranians currently reported to be employed at the Headquarters of the Organization in Vienna were: Qasem Saqafi, Geda Ali Mustafi, and Maindokht Jangali.

3. The Iranian Society of Partisans of Peace (see para 2 - as you can see the English titles are not very specific) (Jamiat-e-Iran-e-Havadaran-e-Solh) was formed during the last week of July 1950 to obtain signatures to the Stockholm Peace Petition. Under the presidency of Malek Sho'ara BAHAR, elderly poet laureate of Iran, a number of non-communist Iranian political leaders and intellectuals were inspired to sign the communist inspired peace petition, including many staunch conservatives. The Organization had little political effect until early 1951 when communist control of the organization became increasingly apparent. Bahar's death on April 22, 1951, removed the last obstacle to full communist exploitation of the Partisans of Peace, as the Association is generally known in Iran. Little or no attempt to suppress the activities of the Association were taken and the soliciting of signatures on the Peace Petition was openly conducted in Tehran and provincial cities. The Partisans lost no change to exploit internal disorders in the fields of labor, etc., during the early 1950's and directed their efforts towards world peace through the media of attacking the U.S. and other allied countries as warmongers and threats to peace. Active communist control became increasingly apparent when the Lankerani brothers edited and published the Association's newspaper Maslemat (policy) and the magazine Setareh Solh (Star of Peace) both of which appeared in August of 1950 and closely followed the communist line.

4. One of the most impressive demonstrations held by any Tudeh front group was organized by the Partisans of Peace on 15 July 1951, when they demonstrated, 10,000 strong, against W. Averell Harriman, President Truman's special envoy. This demonstration started before the American Embassy and ended in a pitched battle at Majlis Square with armored cars and tanks firing on the Partisans of Peace.

5. The Partisans of Peace did their share of 17th Majlis electioneering, in and around December 1951. The majority of Tudeh Party fronts formed a coalition called the "Democratic Party" from which the Partisans of Peace was excluded "because the organ is internationally known to have Soviet support, and therefore cannot properly participate in internal affairs." The Partisans of Peace did back the same candidates as the Tudeh Party, however.

6. From November 1951 through June 1952 the Partisans of Peace planned to hold a Middle East Peace Conference in Tehran. After elaborate plans were laid the Iranian Government warned the Partisans that the conference would not be welcome in Iran. Following this nothing more was heard of the Middle East Peace Conference.

7. Third International Youth Festival for Peace, Berlin 5 - 19 August 1951: This meeting, co-sponsored by the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students, both Communist-front organizations, was attended by a





by a large number of young Iranians rounded up by the Peace Partisan's Organization and the Iranian National Committee of the Berlin Festival in Tehran. In addition to the 49 delegates reported going from Iran about 98 Iranians attended coming from European countries.

8. The World Peace Council, with international headquarters in Prague, is the parent organization to which the Peace Partisans belonged. Members from Iran attended the November 1951 Council meeting in Vienna, where two members were elected to the World Peace Council, and in July 1952 the Peace Partisans sent a delegation to East Berlin.

9. In October 1952 the Partisans of Peace sent three delegates to the Peking Peace Conference through the Soviet Union.

10. A large delegation of the Partisans of Peace attended the Vienna Peace Conference in December 1952.

11. After the Government crackdown on the Tudeh Party in 1953 - 1954 the Partisans of Peace have not been overtly active in Iran. As cited above in paragraph 2, however, the Partisans of Peace Organization is still represented on the World Peace Council.

12. It is hoped that the above will be of assistance. The Partisans of Peace was a completely Communist-controlled and dominated organization."

Dr Chayegan

Jan. 1956

Source - Public Record June 9, 1953

Dr. Seyid Ali SHAYEGAN. He is well educated, but at the same time he is uncertain in his political convictions as shown by his past willingness to work with a Tudeh Minister of Education. He at one time made every effort to get close to Qavam and then left him when his star fell. He joined Dr. Mosadeq's National Front drive and continues to play very close with the Iran Party, although not a formal member, "since this is the only political organization that will have him at the moment".

Ali SHAYEGAN was a Deputy to the 16th and 17th Majlises and one of Mosadeq's very closest associates. He was arrested shortly after Zahedi came into power and was sentenced to 10 years in jail, although he was released in March, 1956. Largely out of fear of the consequences, he has not been at all active in opposition circles. Shayegan went to the United States about a year and a half ago, and has been living there since then, although apparently with no job. What money he has comes from the rent on his home in Tehran. There was some talk that he might be hired to teach at Georgetown University,

SECRET Disp #86 9/5/60.
See M. Moseley Ltr to
Full Disp.

SECRET

but apparently nothing has materialized. His name has been mentioned in connection with several anti-regime propaganda releases originating in the United States, but this is doubtful since he is reported to be extremely frightened for his personal safety and unwilling to become even vaguely involved politically. There was a brief discussion of Shayegan in the Majlis last year when some Deputies criticized the fact that he was permitted to live in the United States. Some Deputies even reported that he entered the country under a United States government grant, but that erroneous statement was later corrected. The fact, however, that the United States government continues to give Shayegan permission to reside in the U.S. is somewhat difficult for the sensitive, suspicious leaders of the present regime to understand.

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Dr. Ali SHAYEGAN, Deputy to 19th Majlis
One of Mosadeq's followers. Tried at the same time as Fatemi. Got two years.

Feb 1957

H.E. Alayar SALEH, Leader of Iran Party

67

Form for Diplomats, Officials, Eminent Persons, Journalists, etc.
(Amended Sept. 1936)

Post Tehran

Date of preparation November 20, 1950

# CONFIDENTIAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA

NOTE.—Consult *Diplomatic Serial 3355 of April 10, 1941*, and references therein. Forms are to be prepared on typewriter in triplicate, one copy for files and two for Department.

Name ALI M (Surname) Alayar (Given name)

Nationality Iranian Title, if any

Date and place of birth 1877, Kashan

Position Deputy to 16th Majlis Date appointed April 1950

Party affiliations National Front

Previous career See below

Languages spoken Persian, English, French

Attitude toward and service in the United States Chief, Iranian Trade and Economic Delegation to the United States, 1941-42.

Family details Brother of Jahanshah Saleh, present Minister of Health, and of Ali Reza Saleh, Embassy's chief Iranian consultant. Married, two sons, [illegible] daughters

Remarks: (Should present a brief word picture of the individual, including race, religion, fraternal affiliations, education, reputation, personality, influence, attitude toward other nations, etc.)

Education: American College, Tehran.

Career:

1918-27: Interpreter, American Legation.
1928: Chief Secretary, Legislature, Tehran.
1927-33: Various positions in Ministry of Justice, chiefly as Prosecuting Attorney.
1933: Head of Monopolies, Ministry of Finance.
1935: Director of Tobacco Monopoly.
1933: Director of Opium Monopoly.
1935: Acting Administrator-General of Customs.
1937: Envoy to Mission in Moscow.
1937: Director-General, Ministry of Finance.
1941-42: Chief, Iranian Trade and Economic Delegation to the U.S.
1942: Minister of Finance (Qavam's cabinet.)
Feb 1943: Minister of Finance (Soheili's cabinet.)
1943: President of Mortgage Bank.
1943-44: Iranian Trade Commissioner to India.
Sept 1944: Minister of Justice (Sa'ed's cabinet.)
Feb 1945: Appointed to High Economic Council but refused to serve.
May 1945: Minister of Justice (Hakimi's cabinet.)
Oct 1945: Appointed Minister-Counselor to Washington but did not proceed.
Oct 1945: Minister without Portfolio (Hakimi's cabinet.)
Dec 1945: Minister of Interior (Hakimi's cabinet.)
Aug 1946-47: Minister of Justice (Qavam's cabinet.)
Apr 1950: Deputy to 16th Majlis, from Kashan.

Founder of Iran Party.
Allied with Tudeh Party from September 1946 to April 1947.

Prepared by Mary Parrish

68

Foreign Assistant
(Title)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—34013-1



Remarks:

Throughout the greater part of his long career in public office, Saleh enjoyed to an unusual degree the confidence and respect of all political camps. He earned a reputation for competence and reliability, and was universally regarded as intelligent, patriotic, and progressive.

It is probably the incontinence of his patriotism and the misguided direction of his devotion to Iran's good which have led him to political blunders and — as a result — have lost him much of his former prestige. Politically confused, he has let patriotism run into blind nationalism; and he has allied himself with "progressive" movements without recognizing their dangerous tendencies or their actual objectives.

Saleh became a founder of the Iran Party because of his conviction that only a drastic explosion could roust the country from its political rut, no doubt believing that this popular movement could set off the necessary fuse. As a member of Qavam's Coalition Cabinet in 1946-47, composed of both Tudeh and Iran Party members, he was drawn into close association with the Tudeh group; and — though he admits that the shady alliance was a bad mistake — he has never lost the resultant stigma. More recently, his affiliation with the oppositionist National Front can probably be explained by similar motives — a belief that this group would work for progressive and constructive accomplishment. His attitude in the current Majlis, however, has consistently reflected the same negative strategy which characterizes the entire movement, and this attitude has cost him the confidence of many former supporters.

Saleh's extreme nationalism has also resulted in quirks of personality which make him difficult to work with. He is temperamental, easily insulted, exacting to a fault, and thoroughly unreasonable when he feels that his country has been impinged upon. In the summer of 1944, when Saleh was serving as Minister of Justice, the Iranian government attempted to remove Hossein Nafici from his post as Director of Iranian State Railways, on trumped-up charges of malfeasance in office — actually for political reasons. To this the American authorities objected strenuously and were able to prevent Nafici's removal. Saleh was furious and became greatly upset over what he termed unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of Iran, could not or would not see that the government's action was serious interference with the war effort as well as a violation of the agreement for the operation of the railway. He has proved himself equally temperamental in dealing with his own countrymen, as indicated by his strange conduct as Minister of Finance in 1943, when he refused to take orders from the Prime Minister and declined to attend cabinet meetings that were held after office hours.

In 1946, Saleh's son and daughter died — a tragedy from which he has never recovered. Though his idiosyncracies and political instability can be party discounted by this personal trouble and by the sincerity of his intentions, he is no longer considered reliable by American observers. Even his brothers, Ali Pasha Saleh and Dr. Jahanshah Saleh, both express great disappointment in him.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUPPLEMENTARY BIOGRAPHIC DATA

March 18, 1952

SALEH, Alayar

Supplementing Embassy's CBD of November 20, 1950.

Career:

February 13, 1952: Minister of Interior, Dr. Mosadeq's Cabinet.

March 17, 1952: Resigned.

Remarks:

Upon assuming the office of Minister of Interior, Mr. Saleh relinquished his opportunity to be a candidate for election to the 17th Majlis. He has now announced that he will run for election from Kashan.

One of Dr. Mosadeq's most trusted satellites, Mr. Saleh was undoubtedly chosen for the position as Minister of Interior to take over the difficult business of elections, which had brought great discredit to the Government and which had been progressing at a grindingly slow pace. While in office, Saleh speeded up the electoral process, ensuring that sufficient deputies would be elected to open the new Majlis immediately after Ne-Ruz.

An extreme anti-foreign attitude was recently displayed by Saleh in an interview with the correspondent of Kayhan. "The Iranian people will not allow the re-entry of foreign influence in their country, after their intensive struggle," said Saleh. "The British and Americans think that by exerting economic pressure they can bring us to our knees. Every now and then they put in an appearance and try to waste the time of the Government, which should devote itself to elaborating economic and social plans. They also try to make us believe that only with foreign assistance can we survive. They are sadly mistaken about our powers of endurance.

"We can carry on without the oil experts, as many independent countries have no oil at all. We can meet our own oil requirements without foreign help. Once the imperialistic powers recognise that we have seriously begun to carry out economic and social reforms, they will be only too willing to come to us and accept our terms."

MRParrish/mrp
350.3



FYI Tehran

PRESS RELEASE

IRANIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 4, 1952

AMBASSADOR ALLAH-YAR SALEH'S REMARKS
AT THE IRAN-AMERICA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE DINNER

At a dinner given in honor of the new Iranian Ambassador by the Iran-America Chamber of Commerce on December 3d, at the Rainbow Room, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, Ambassador Allah-Yar Saleh delivered a speech, in the beginning of which he gave a brief history of the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry and of Iran's dispute with Britain.

Ambassador Saleh stated that from the very beginning of nationalization of the oil industry Iran had expressed willingness to do everything possible in order that the flow of Iranian oil towards the Western markets would not be interrupted. Iran had also expressed willingness to compensate the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company according to any legal standards that had been acted upon in any country and which would be more favorable to Britain. He stated he was sure that Iran would welcome any new approach that would be made on the basis of just compensation and which would insure the flow of Iranian oil and at the same time insure the interests of Iran.

In regard to recent developments in Iran, Ambassador Saleh explained the conditions that have resulted in the conclusion of the first period of Iran's Senate. He also explained that the people of Iran are anxious to see reforms in Government and social welfare. He expressed regret that because of the lengthy discussions on oil, the Iranian Government had not found time to take the necessary steps on reforms at an earlier date. He explained, however, that after the break of Anglo-Iranian relations, when negotiations on oil had temporarily ceased, the Government of Dr. Mossadegh had launched upon a series of radical reforms in the Department of Justice and other Government services. He explained that if these reforms are not accomplished by a National Government, the people of Iran will be disappointed in their leaders and might

be influenced by extremist elements, thus endangering the integrity of Iran and international peace.

Ambassador Saleh referred to an article which recently appeared in the London Times, signed by Mr. M. Philips Price, member of the House of Commons, in which he said "Persia is lost to the free world," implying that Iran should be considered as a country already behind the Iron Curtain. The Ambassador called this new English tactic a method for impressing upon the incoming administration the necessity of giving up Iran as a lost cause and refraining from helping Iran in a solution of its economic difficulties. He said by this method England apparently tries to make conditions difficult for the National Government in order that they would eventually yield to the terms proposed by Britain. Ambassador Saleh explained how ridiculous the above remark of Mr. Price had been, considering that there are hundreds of nationals from Western countries in Iran, including Point IV officials, who are witnesses as to how sincerely the Iranian National Government is struggling for the maintenance of its freedom.

Ambassador Saleh concluded by saying the economic conditions in Iran may become worse than they are now, but Iranians will never move before unjust impositions of any foreign power.

--ooOoo--



**CONFIDENTIAL**

**Mr. Clock** **February 4, 1957**

**T.A. Cassilly**

**At lunch on February 3, Seyed Zia-ed-Din TABATABAI had the following comments on the Iran Party's declaration:**

**Alayer SALEH is an honest and capable man who evidently feels the time has come for him to make a bid for more power. He seems to realize that no party or individual would have a chance in Iran now without the support of the U.S.**

**Mr. Tabatabai gave the impression that he thought the party's communique was drawn up after prior consultation with American representatives. Mr. Saleh thinks that with U.S. backing, he can get the Shah to appoint him Prime Minister.**

**Asked how much chance he thought Saleh might have, Seyed Zia replied that it depends on how much support he receives from the U.S. Tabatabai believes that Saleh has the backing of a wide range of liberal sentiment in Iran including most of the former supporters of Dr. Mosadeq.**

**TACassilly/mm**

Form FS 405 (revised) NOV., 1951

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Foreign Service of the United States of America

**BIOGRAPHIC DATA FORM**

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS: For full instructions on submission of biographic data and use of this form see 4 FSM 500.

POST: Tehran

DATE: Feb. 21, 1957

REPORTING OFFICER: KCClark/ms

COPIES TO: GTI

NAME: SALEH, Alayar

NATIONALITY: Iranian

PRESENT POSITION: Head of Iran Party

DATA AND REMARKS: SUPPLEMENTARY BIOGRAPHIC DATA

**Family:**

Saleh's father, Mohaser-el-Mamalek, was a landowner who was known for his democratic ideas. His father and mother, Khorshid Kiqa, had eight boys of which Alayar was the fourth.

**Career:**

1945: Represented Iran in San Francisco at the first United Nations Conference.

1950-52: While a deputy in the 16th Majlis, Saleh was a member of the National Front, Chief of the Mixed Oil Commission, member of the Iranian Mission to the Security Council when Iran defended itself on the oil nationalization question, and Counselor of the Iranian Mission before the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

Aug. 1953: Submitted his resignation as Iranian Ambassador to Washington and returned to Iran.

1953-56: Under surveillance by the government as leader of the National Resistance Movement.

April 1956: Took bast (refuge) in the Majlis building and went on a hunger strike for one day in the Majlis as a protest against the rigging of the elections (see Embdes. 868, April 12, 1956, Confidential; and Embdes. 875, April 14, 1956, Confidential). Was removed with a minimum of effort by the local authorities, after which he went home where he was kept under surveillance.

Jan.21 1957: In the name of the Iran Party, Saleh published a communique in which he announced his approval of President Eisenhower's new policy for the Middle East, and of the Iranian Constitution. The communique aroused violent protest in the Majlis

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Majlis and Senate, especially by Senators Jamal Emami and Ali Dashti and resulted in the Senate's passing a resolution declaring the Iran Party to be illegal (see Embdes. 743, February 20, 1957, Confidential). Tehran buzzed with "bazaar rumors" that he was the Americans' candidate for Prime Minister. Generally speaking, his reputation is that of an honest idealistic but impractical leader of the middle class.

Sources:
Iran-Presse, February 4, 5, and 6, 1957
Pelk Iran, April 9, 1956
Embassy Personnel

SALEH, Alayar (Basic biographic report of Nov. 20, 1950; supplementals of March 18, 1952, Oct. 6, 1952, Feb. 21, 1957)

838 5/14/59

As was stated in the last report, Saleh's activities are still quite limited, although he does see his close associates regularly. In spite of the fact that Saleh is probably the most moderate of all the nationalist opposition leaders in his comments and criticisms, he should still be ranked next to MOSADEQ in both prestige among and affection from the urban middle class groups of Iran.

Saleh's last public statement of any note was his backing of the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Baghdad Pact (1957). Since then he seems to have had little opportunity to exercise leadership or set the policy line for the nationalists. If this lack of activity continues, Saleh is likely to become more of a figurehead and symbol like MOSADEQ, but for the moment he is still the most likely possibility to be Prime Minister should there be a strong swing away from the present make-up of the government.

Alayar SALEH remains exactly as reported in the Embassy's Despatch 838 of May 14, 1959. In prestige and general leadership qualities, he is second only to Mosadeq among all the nationalist leaders. Except for a few of the younger men, Saleh is as active as any nationalist, although his "activity" is hardly of the traditional political sort. It consists almost entirely of meeting regularly with old political associates and friends to discuss current Iranian government policy. Because of the stringency of police control, there is little else he can do. He is presently unemployed and in financial straits. He has no interest in money although he receives a small pension and help from his family when necessary. Recently he has not been in good health.

State - October 1959 SECRET/NOFORN NIS-33
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SĀLEH, 'Allahyār

'Allahyār Sāleh, a former Ambassador to the United States and eight times a cabinet minister, is the founder and respected leader of the opposition Iran Party. Once the strongest organized segment of the National Front led by former Prime Minister Mohammad Mosadeq (see biography), the Iran Party is now loosely linked to the National Resistance Movement (NRM). Although Sāleh is considered a moderate, favorable to the reign (if not the rule) of the Shah (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi--see biography), and vehemently anti-Communist, his activities are still circumscribed by the narrow limits of official toleration of opposition activity. As a former member of the National Front, he has lived for years under close surveillance by the regime. Reportedly not a positive or aggressive man, he has allegedly become discouraged by the failure of the nationalists to enlist the sympathy of the United States in their cause, and is hesitant to lead the Iran Party into closer association with other NRM groups. Sāleh's position midway between the regime and the extreme opposition is dramatized by the fact that at least once in the past he has been invited to the Palace, where he conferred with Minister of Court Hosein 'Ala (see biography) and gave him his views on the political corruption and lack

of freedom in Iran. In 1955 Sāleh was even invited to join the 'Ala cabinet. Nevertheless, he is reported to be a member of the NRM "Group of Ten," the inner cabal of intellectual opposition to the regime. Sāleh refused the 1955 offer to become Minister of Finance in protest against the suppression of the NRM and the continued imprisonment of Mosadeq. Ironically, when Mosadeq was released the following year, Sāleh was among those placed under house surveillance.

Reputedly honest, 'Allahyār Sāleh has displayed a devotion to principle quite rare in the personality-centered ethos of Iran. As a convinced nationalist and Mosadeq's Ambassador to the United States (August 1952-August 1953), he refused the offer by his lifelong friend, Fazlollah Zāhedi (see biography), to stay on in that position after Zāhedi's 1953 coup which brought down the National Front. His public statement at that time, that no Iranian Government opposed to Mosadeq and the National Front could endure, enhanced his prestige in nationalist circles. On his return to Iran from the United States he was not permitted to campaign for the Majlis in his home community of Kashan, where he was a certain winner. The year before, Sāleh had served as Mosadeq's Minister of Interior (February-March 1952) and had been





forced to resign for refusing to cancel certain Majlis elections which were going against the chosen National Front candidates. The Shah respected Sāleh's integrity, and reports that the Iranian ruler was considering him as Mosadeq's successor may have prompted the latter to send him to Washington later that year. In April 1956 Sāleh went on a hunger strike as a protest against the rigging of elections for the 18th Majlis.

'Allahyār Sāleh was born at Kashan in 1897. Educated at the American College in Tehran, he speaks fluent English, as well as French and Persian. His first job was that of interpreter at the U.S. Legation in Tehran, a post which he filled from 1918 to 1927. In the latter year, during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi, he began the career as government administrator which was to be his chief occupation in the ensuing two decades. Sāleh held various posts in the Ministry of Justice, chiefly that of Prosecuting Attorney, until 1933 when he became Director of Monopolies in the Ministry of Finance. He was named Director General of the Ministry in 1937 and subsequently visited Moscow on an economic mission. In August 1940 he came to Washington as chairman of a delegation sent to negotiate a reciprocal trade agreement

between Iran and the United States. U.S. officials found him agreeable to deal with and enthusiastic about his reception here. In February 1942 he became Minister of Finance in the cabinet of Ahmad Qavam. In October of that year he was named chairman of the board of directors of the Mortgage Bank of Iran, and the next month was sent abroad as Iranian commercial representative in India. Sāleh was made Minister of Justice in the cabinet of Mohammad Sa'ed in May 1944 and reappointed to head that Ministry in the government of Ibrahim Hakimi the following year upon his return to Iran from the United Nations Conference on International Organization held in April 1945 in San Francisco. At this time U.S. officials considered him thoroughly versed in economic and legal affairs, a competent administrator, an incorruptible patriot, and a good friend of the United States.

In 1945 Sāleh served as Minister Without Portfolio and Minister of the Interior in the Hakimi cabinet. When Sāleh founded the Iran Party in 1943 he allied it temporarily with the Communist-controlled Tudeh Party in the coalition cabinet of Ahmad Qavam (1946-47). He was Minister of Justice in this government, an association which was used later by his nationalist rivals to compromise his anti-Tudeh position in the post-Mosadeq Iran Party. Sāleh's Anglophobia is





sometimes mentioned as a reason for his somewhat pro-Soviet sympathies in the immediate postwar period. Elected to the Majlis from Kashan in 1950, he joined the Mosadeq bloc of deputies intent upon nationalization of the oil industry. As chairman of the Joint Parliamentary Commission for the Nationalization of Oil, he accompanied Dr. Mosadeq to the United Nations where he pleaded the Iranian case before the Security Council in October 1951. During this period he was considered anti-Western and opposed to the presence of foreign advisers in Iran. In 1952 the U.S. Ambassador to Iran characterized him as unstable and lacking in judgment.

Sāleh's attitude toward foreign intervantion evolved radically in the later years of his political exile. Apparently convinced that political freedom and economic progress in Iran depended on U.S. support, he risked his standing among his nationalist colleagues to come out flatly for President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Middle East Doctrine in January 1957. On behalf of his Iran Party, he pledged to join the fight against Communism and to uphold the Baghdad Pact. Such an enthusiastic public embrace of U.S. policy proved embarrassing to U.S. officials in the resultant uproar in which Sāleh was accused of

being the "American candidate" for Prime Minister, and his Iran Party almost declared illegal. The party's existence continues to be jeopardized by the bill to outlaw it which remains shelved in the Majlis. Sāleh's career has been marked by difficulties brought on by his impetuosity, stubbornne-, and emotional excitability. His prestige is unimpaired, however, owing to his ability to project himself as the image of honesty, idealism, integrity, and true national consciousness. His emotional nationalism and his lack of a sense of humor have been known to render personal intercourse with him a delicate matter.

'Allahyār Sāleh is married and has two sons and a daughter living. Two other children died in 1946. One of his brothers, Jehanshah Sāleh, is a former Minister of Health, and another, Ali Pasha Sāleh, is a consultant at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Both are considered very friendly toward the United States.



SECRET

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

"This document consists of 16 pages Number 4 of 10 copies, Series B."

FROM : Embassy, Tehran

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

SUBJECT:

1

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Alayar Saleh and the Coming Elections.

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The Government's Alternatives . . . . . 8

## Introduction

Ever since the annulment of the summer's elections, supporters of the [illegible] have cast about for ways by which the forthcoming elections could be [illegible] the appearance of change while the essentials of control remained in the hands of the government. These speculations have a special significance for the political future of Alayar SALEH. For it is apparent that a number of important government officials think they have discovered in Saleh a unique and opportune candidate who has a high degree of popular appeal with a low degree of threat to the status quo.

Saleh's overwhelming popularity, in Azerbaijan and to some extent in [illegible] moreover, squarely confronts the government with the problem of what

employ toward him in the next elections. For wholly apart from his own character and opinions, Saleh has become a symbol. To many Iranians he personifies honesty where graft and corruption have been the rule, he embodies the contempt of the rising middle class towards entrenched wealth and nepotism, he evokes emotionally-charged memories of the days of Mosadeq, and, of greatest immediate importance to the present government, his failure to be elected from Kashan stands as a scornful indictment of the Shah's promises of free elections.

As the new elections approach, therefore, Saleh is likely to become of increasing concern to the present regime and the part he plays may be the single most important aspect of the elections. The purpose of this despatch is to assemble in one place all the material on Saleh pertinent to the part he may play in the elections -- and afterward. To these ends the despatch will be divided into two parts, the first of which will correlate what is known about Saleh's character, political philosophy and recent activities, while the second will analyze his possible behavior as a member of the Twentieth Majlis, examining particularly any susceptibility to pressure from extremist elements.

## Personal Characteristics

Allayar Saleh is, above all, a man of fundamental honesty in a land where Diogenes might have searched long for his equal. It is in fact the uniqueness of his honesty which has occasionally led him to eccentric behavior where matters of principle are involved. In revulsion against the widespread corruption and venality of public service, Saleh tends to raise high the white flag of honor in ways which seem bizarre and overly dramatic to Western observers. Perhaps the most publicized example of Saleh's flair for the grand gesture occurred in April 1956 when, in protest against that year's election rigging, he took asylum in the Majlis and began a hunger strike. He was soon dissuaded from both, and the incident petered out ineffectually before his supporters could decide how to take advantage of it. An Embassy despatch of the time commented that had a man of the political perception of, say, Baqai, been involved instead of Saleh, the incident would have had far more dangerous consequences for the government. An equally revealing story (told to the reporting officer by a family friend of Saleh) has it that upon his return in 1944 from government service in India, he was told by his wife that by economizing on her clothes and other expenses she had managed to save from their salary a considerable sum of money, with which they could at last pay back their debtors and start a savings account. To her amazement Saleh demanded the money and reimbursed every rial to the Ministry of Finance, commenting that it was shameful for the government to use the people's money to overpay its employees.

If Saleh's behavior is at times impetuous and Quixotic, his devotion to principle is nonetheless real. In March 1952, as Mosadeq's Minister of Interior, he was ordered to cancel elections which were running counter to the majority





front candidates. He refused and was shortly thereafter forced to resign. The following year after the anti-Mosadeq coup, General Zahedi asked him to stay on as Ambassador to the United States, an offer which Saleh declined, stating publicly that only a Nationalist government could endure in Iran. Again in 1955 he refused Prime Minister Ala's offer of the post of Minister of Finance because of the continued imprisonment of Mosadeq and the suppression of the National Resistance Movement. These actions would carry less weight were Saleh independently wealthy; on the contrary, however, he has been in continual financial straits for the past seven years, and can scarcely afford to refuse an offer of employment.

Although not an effective politician in the traditional sense, Saleh does have the reputation of being a highly competent administrator. He is intelligent and, through many years in the Ministries of Justice and Finance, thoroughly versed in both legal and economic affairs. He is particularly conscious of the need for surrounding himself with hard-working subordinates. In 1945, for example, when scheduled to go to Washington as Ambassador Ala's deputy, Saleh insisted upon reorganizing the Mission with efficient, English-speaking officials, and finally succeeded after a bitter struggle with the Foreign Ministry.

In spite of these qualities, Saleh has been described by those who know him best as stubborn, self-willed and singularly unwilling to accept advice. And in 1952 the U.S. Ambassador to Iran characterized him as emotionally unstable and lacking in judgment.

Saleh's personality is, finally, made up of a number of more elusive characteristics; these are perhaps best illustrated by his reaction to the curious position in which he finds himself in Kashan. Every recent visitor to Kashan has commented that Saleh's standing is more that of a religious leader than a political leader. His house and car have been given him, his servants work for nothing but their keep, and the shop-keepers of Kashan refuse to accept payment for his purchases. A never-ending parade of Kashis comes to him for advice, for his comfort and intercession on their behalf with the authorities. He has only to appear on the street to be surrounded by admirers, and virtually no municipal decision is made without his consent. All this Saleh accepts as his due. He only has he a romantic, paternal attachment for the lower classes whom he sees as the salvation of Iran, but he is also a vain man who is extremely susceptible to flattery. More significant, however, is the lack of humor and objectivity with which he receives the adulation of Kashan. For the deadly seriousness of Saleh's view of himself may be the one factor which will stand in the way of any rapprochement with the government.

## Political Career

The Embassy has accumulated a considerable mass of material along the road which Saleh's political career, material which makes it feasible to analyze systematically the development of his political views. Since 1943, when Saleh started

...political activities with the founding of the Iran Party, the progression of ... ideas, while not necessarily logical, has been clear and unambiguous. That is, while his views have changed considerably, the evidence at each stage of his career has been consistent, indicating the changes are sincere. It is possible, therefore, to make with reasonable certainty a number of statements about Saleh's present convictions.

1) ... is strongly anti-communist and has a clear perception of the nature of Soviet strategy and tactics; 2) he is convinced that only through rapid economic progress can the educated be kept from revolt and the communists beaten on their own game; 3) he believes in the necessity of U.S. support as the least of three evils in a world where neighbors of the Soviet Union cannot afford to stand alone; and 4) as a supporter of the institution of monarchy in Iran. (Albeit with strenuous objections to the Shah's interference in the day-to-day operations of the government) he occupies a position midway between the regime and the ... opposition.

In March 1946 Saleh forecast accurately the coming Soviet tactic in Azerbaijan. ... Bevin quotes him as saying: "The Russians will use the Iranian leaders to set up popularly supported republics in Azerbaijan, Mazanderan and Gilan. Then Russia will say that neither she nor any other country has the right to interfere since these local governments have been formed in keeping with the principles of the Atlantic Charter." Yet a year later, in August of 1946, Saleh allied the Iran Party with the Communist-dominated Tudeh in the coalition cabinet of Ahmad Qavam as-Saltaneh. Saleh's idealistic temperament was fair game for the Popular Front line of social reform; and Qavam, moreover, cleverly took advantage of his political naievete in order to buy desperately needed time from the Soviets. Whatever the reason, Saleh's close cooperation with the Tudeh during this period was later used by his nationalist enemies to discredit his post-Mosadeq anti-communist position.

A 1945 intelligence report quotes Saleh in one of his most firmly held convictions. The wealthy landlords in control of the government, he said, should have had enough sense to realize that the only way to combat communist propaganda was to establish a detailed political program -- a nationalist social revolution -- which would improve the position of the peasant masses. Unless they did this they would, sooner or later, lose everything they possessed. However, he added, these landlords, having great faith in the cleverness of the British, remained certain that England would maintain the status quo in Iran.

In April 1950, Saleh was elected to the Sixteenth Majlis, and as leader of the strongest segment of the National Front, was a major factor in Mosadeq's rise to power. As Chairman of the Joint Parliamentary Oil Commission, he became embittered by what he considered British intransigence. His statements were increasingly characterized by extreme xenophobia. In an interview published in Peyham in early 1952 Saleh said: "The Iranian people will not allow the re-entry





of foreign influence in their country after their intensive struggle. The British and Americans think that by exerting economic pressure they can bring us to our knees. Every now and then they put in an appearance and try to waste the time of the government, which should devote itself to elaborating economic and social plans....Once the imperialistic powers recognize that we have seriously begun to carry out economic and social reforms, they will be only too willing to come to us and accept our terms."

By late 1951 Saleh's views had changed radically. CAS in December of that year reported him as saying that the National Resistance Movement realized its mistake of trying to cooperate with the Tudeh Party. He stated further that the NRM should establish a new policy -- a middle-of-the-road program oriented towards the west, nationalistic yet following neither the extreme left nor the "extreme, corrupt right". It is at this period that Saleh (and other NRM leaders) are first reported as advocating close cooperation with the United States. This decision was a wholly pragmatic one, based on the assumption that no Iranian government could come to power without foreign help. Of the help available, "the Soviets want a neutral, do-nothing government...which will not further economic progress in Iran. The British want to get a stranglehold on the economy in order to profit financially -- which would not be so objectionable if the British did not try to control the internal politics as well. The Americans at least have no territorial or political aspirations in Iran and want a democratic, progressive government, though it must be one hundred percent anti-communist." Once the decision had been reached, Saleh proceeded to make a number of overtures to enlist U.S. support (such as inviting Ambassador Henderson to his home and trying to contact Justice Douglas). These culminated in 1957 in his ill-fated declaration of support for the Eisenhower Doctrine. When this statement not only nearly caused the Iran Party to be outlawed by an enraged Majlis but also greatly exasperated the American Embassy, Saleh gave up. In conversations with fellow Nationalists, he regained of enlisting ... support. He professed not to understand "how the United States continues to ally itself with a dying cause when every dictate of long-term, practical, power politics demands that the United States be friendly with the inevitably triumphant nationalist movements."

Throughout the mid-50's the Tudeh Party, in newspapers, throw-aways and pamphlets, violently attacked what it called the "right wing" of the NRM, that is, those leaders considered most strongly opposed to collaboration with the Communists. The Iran Party leadership, ... especially Saleh, was denounced as seeking a deal with the U.S. After the Iraqi revolution, the Tudeh Party Central Committee, despite continued public attacks on the NRM, consistently tried to establish contact with high-level nationalist leaders in order to cooperate with them. CAS reports that since 1953 numerous overtures have been made to Saleh himself, all unsuccessful.

Indicative of the changed attitude of the NRM was the tacit agreement that ... [illegible] ... must not be repeated. The

meeting of the NF Central Committee, reported by CAS, it was suggested that sentimentalists and extreme idealists caused Mosadeq's failure, and that though the Nationalists could not publicly disavow his ideals, top-level policy need not be discussed with the rank-and-file NF membership but might be worked out along other lines. It should be noted that Saleh had not only changed the tone of the Nationalist program to one of moderation but had restuffed the NF leadership to reflect this change. Young idealists such as Asgar Parsa and Dr. Shapur Bakhtiar were dropped from the NF Central Committee after it was found they created too much friction. Below Saleh the leadership was young (forty-six) and generally moderate; it consisted of Ahmad Zanganeh, Hassan Nazih Hassan, Ayatollah Moazami, Engr. Mehdi Bazargan and Dr. Abdollah Entezami.

From 1956, when the government refused to allow him to run for the Nineteenth Majlis, until the elections of this summer, Saleh's political activities were limited. His activity, at any rate, was hardly of the traditional sort. According to an Embassy Biographic Report of February 1960, "it consists almost entirely of meeting regularly with old political associates and friends to discuss current Iranian government policy. If this lack of activity continues, Saleh is likely to become more of a figurehead and symbol like Mosadeq, but for the moment he is still the most likely possibility to be Prime Minister should there be a strong swing away from the present make-up of the government".

Summer Election Activities

Only a few things need be said of Saleh's conduct of his campaign this summer. After it became clear that the election was to be controlled, Saleh's tactic was to throw as much light as possible (both at home and abroad) on the rigging activities of the government, and in this he was highly successful. Yet throughout he consciously and persistently tried to disassociate himself from the extremist nationalist elements and to avoid an irreparable break with the Shah.

The following are the highlights of Saleh's election activity.

On June 29 the Nationalists issued, over Saleh's signature, an open letter to Prime Minister Iqbal announcing Nationalist participation in the elections and urging that the government's promises of freedom be fulfilled. As expected, SAVAK refused permission to publish in the major newspapers, and the Nationalists therefore distributed several thousand mimeographed copies throughout the country. Saleh's decision to draft this declaration can be ascribed in part to pressure from his followers. He, in fact, stated that the younger Nationalists would desert him and soon embark on a more radical course, including alliance with the Tudeh Party, if he failed at this juncture to demonstrate his leadership. (In this connection, persistent tension was visible throughout the campaign between the Nationalist leadership and student elements; Saleh, for example, was forced to clamp down on University Nationalists after they had published over the NF





signature an intemperate pamphlet criticizing the Shah and calling for Mosadeq's return.)

Meanwhile, in Kashan, Saleh's supporters were systematically defacing two thousand posters of Majlis candidate Hasan Lajevardi and holding heavily attended daily meetings at their leader's home. 150 Gendarmes in full battle dress from the Fourteenth Tehran Regiment were despatched to Kashan in August for the duration of the elections. Throughout Saleh insisted that Kashis maintain a dignified attitude and refrain from provocative demonstrations and slogans. Privately he expressed his conviction that "the more-or-less polite harrassment" would continue and intensify, and that although the Government would try at all levels to stop him, he was absolutely determined to fight to the end.

Towards the end of July, according to one CAS report, Saleh contacted the Shah and told him that it would be in the Shah's own interest to allow his election if the people so desired. The Shah then reportedly gave two sets of orders: first, overtly, the election in Kashan should be good and clean, and second, under-the-table, that Saleh be stopped from winning at all costs. Realizing that Saleh had invited a number of foreign newsmen to observe the voting, the Shah at first decided that the Government should delay the Kashan elections, then rush through Lajevardi while reporters were no longer looking. By the time the elections were cancelled, however, the evidence indicates that the Shah had changed his mind, and had decided to avert trouble by holding no elections in Kashan at all.

Relations with Nationalist Party Leadership

A factor bearing strongly on any decision regarding Saleh's participation in the Majlis is the internal power relationship within the nationalist leadership and the degree and kind of pressure to which he would be subjected. Unfortunately, any statement about this relationship is based on fragmentary evidence and is necessarily speculative. The evidence does, however, confirm the image of Saleh as working for more modest objectives than most Nationalist leaders, and it shows that the latter are, not surprisingly, frustrated by having to knuckle under to a pallid campaign conducted by one whom they consider a colorless personality.

The first of several disputes reported this summer arose when Saleh on July 13 refused to permit the election of a central committee for the organization of Nationalist campaign efforts but insisted that members of the committee be appointed by himself. Engineer Mehdi Bazergan and Hassan Nazie particularly opposed Saleh's dictatorial manner. Saleh, however, said that since he was taking the risks, he must also have the control of Nationalist election activity. A subsequent CAS report indicated that the rift had been at least temporarily smoothed over, and that Nazie and Bazergan had agreed to follow Saleh's directions.

Saleh was faced with the other side of the coin in mid-September when he was severely criticized for refusing to exercise his leadership and take a more active part in the abortive Nationalist demonstration of September 1. At a meeting of Tehran Nationalist leaders, Dr. Shahpur Bakhtiar accused Saleh of letting down the Nationalist cause by selfishly staying in the pleasant atmosphere of Kashan instead of facing the more disturbing climate of Tehran. Bakhtiar stated that he had called a meeting of Iran Party members and that about fifty percent of those summoned appeared and endorsed his views. Saleh, Bakhtiar concluded, had abdicated his leadership of the Iran Party, and the time was, therefore, ripe for someone else (Bakhtiar) to succeed him. Saleh's dilemma is underlined by the fact that he had been dissuaded from coming to Tehran for fear of too close association in the Government's eye with the activist wing of the National Front.

An interesting development in early September was speculation that right-wing independents Ali Amini, Seyed Jafar Behbehani and Arsalan Khalatbari were working towards the formation of a third, so-called "Liberal" party, close to the Nationalists. Negotiations were, according to CAS, undertaken with the Nationalists, and it was decided that Saleh would direct the party, although Amini would be its titular head. Amini later said, however, that he had no plans to convert his "third party" into anything more than a club since he had come to the conclusion that the Shah would not let a third party accomplish anything.

A brief word may be in order about the present composition of Nationalist leadership. The "National Front" was officially revived on July 21, 1960 after a seven year period of inactivity. It is organized into an executive committee of five to eight members, a central committee of fifty members, a congress, provincial organizations, and professional and trade groups. The Congress membership may fairly be said to cover the whole spectrum of Nationalist political belief, from accommodation with the Tudeh and playing the Soviets off against the U.S. to an insistence on less interference on the part of the Shah in government affairs. Within the National Front are the Iran Party, the People of Iran Party, the Pan-Iran Party, and one segment of the Third Force. Without are Dr. Mozafar Baqai's Toilers' Party and Khalil Maleki's Third Force "Socialist" Party. The National Resistance Movement, according to CAS reports, is currently acting as the clandestine arm of the National Front, and seems to cater particularly to University students and bazaar merchants. Known to be presently serving on the NF Executive Committee are: Shahpur Bakhtiar (an activist), Karim Sanjabi (also to the left, with strong neutralist inclinations), Hager Kazemi and Jahangir Haqshenas (both moderate nationalists,) and Saleh.

Most Recent Activity

Much of Saleh's activity this fall derives from the changed attitude of the Government. To a friend he confided that although under the previous Government





he was often confined to his house, he now had free rein to do as he wished. Although a number of the Shah's advisors (notably Teimur Bakhtiar and Hosein Ala) have been urging closer relations with the Nationalists, it is the new Prime Minister who has made the difference. Sharif-Emami stated to CAS on September 20 that he was encouraging the Shah to stop attacking the less compromised followers of Mosadeq in order to win their confidence and cooperation, and, in fact, to pave the way for their election to the Twentieth Majlis. He said further that he hoped to appoint Saleh Minister without Portfolio in his Cabinet; this, he believed, would have a profound effect on University and professional circles, making it possible to hold elections without worrying whether the University was in session. In this connection a friend of Saleh told the reporting officer that she had asked him directly whether he would accept a cabinet post. Saleh replied that he would accept no cabinet position on a silver platter; he wanted only to serve the people of Kashan as an elected representative of the Majlis from his home district.

On September 21 the Shah said to CAS that it might be wise to permit the Nationalists to play a more active role in national life, as certainly only a few associated with Mosadeq or the Tudeh in the past were really dangerous. During this same week the Embassy received a number of reports that SAVAK was engaged in intensive research on the recent activities and political beliefs of Mosadeq's associates. General Alavi-Kia, Acting Chief of SAVAK, after sifting through all the data on 115 Nationalists, recommended the following eight for consideration for important government posts: Ahmad Zanganeh, Dr. Karim Sanjabi, Eng. Jahangir Haqshenas, Dr. Mohammad Nasiri, Saleh, Mohammad Mariman, Shams ed Din Alami, and Dr. Mohammad Ali Maleki.

The Prime Minister's groundwork set the stage for an important meeting in early November between Saleh and the Shah's representative, Hosein Ala. Also present were Golam Hossein Sadiqi and Jahangir Haqshenas of the National Front and Professor Yahya Adl, Acting Secretary of the Pardom Party. Ala reportedly asked Saleh if the NF would cooperate more closely with the Government in the coming elections. Saleh replied that he would be happy to cooperate if the Shah would delegate authority to a responsible Prime Minister; he refused, however, to ally himself with the Government under present conditions. The Nationalists now attribute the Shah's overtures (erroneously it would seem from the above chronology) to the election of Senator Kennedy, and are congratulating themselves on having achieved a moral victory.

The Saleh-Ala meeting appears to have convinced the Shah that he had after all only two choices regarding Saleh: either to let him run as a delegate to the Twentieth Majlis from Kashan, or not to let him run. Prior to this meeting he had shown an understandable fondness for more palatable alternatives, such as letting a compromised Saleh run or bring him into the Cabinet as Minister Without Portfolio.

An interesting sidelight to the Saleh-Ala meeting seems to be

Embassy officer by Saleh's brother, Ali Pasha. Ali Pasha (who is acutely conscious that he may be suspected by the Shah of acting as a go-between for the American Embassy and his brother) had been notified of Saleh's impending arrival from Kashan, and decided to meet his train. He found, however, that a large group of Nationalists planned to demonstrate at the Tehran terminal, and so decided to head his brother off at Shahriyar, the next station down the line. Ali Pasha told Saleh that he must choose between being used as a tool by the activists and working seriously for his election to the Majlis. After considerable discussion, Saleh agreed to by-pass the demonstrations, and the two went privately to Tehran by car.

A secondary motive for Saleh's trip to Tehran was to review the National Front program. He conferred with Nationalist leaders (in particular Darius Foroughar and Ibrahim Karim-Abadi) and discussed participation in the municipal elections. On November 19, four days after he left Tehran, Foroughar and Karim-Abadi visited Saleh in Kashan to continue the discussions.

The Government's Alternatives

Before arriving at a decision in respect to Saleh, there are certain questions which the present regime must resolve. The immediate problem is whether pressure for liberization has so far developed that the Shah cannot afford another round of elections in which no opportunity is afforded for Nationalist participation. And second, whether in the long run, political stresses to which the Government is subject might be alleviated by the incorporation of dissident elements into the regime. Balanced against these considerations must be the degree of threat which the Government would incur by Nationalist Majlis participation, considering particularly the privileges of parliamentary immunity from arrest and greater access to the means of communication. A similar concern, commonly described as "opening the door to the Nationalists", is that election of a number of Nationalists would generate irresistible pressure for even greater (and presumably more radical) Nationalist participation, and would presage a major change in the status quo.

If this is the Government's dilemma, what should its solution be in the case of Dr. Saleh? Given Saleh's character and political views, one basic question remains: how great is his ability to maintain independence in the face of Nationalist efforts to use him as a wedge towards radical goals? The answer to this question depends on Saleh's ability to capitalize on the two main sources of his support: 1) substantial popular backing, and 2) the moderate elements of Nationalist leadership. He would inevitably have to make concessions to the majority of Nationalists more radical than he; but he has been particularly adept at placating these elements while withholding the substance of their demands. Past experience suggests, therefore, that were elected a member of the Majlis, he would be able to maintain his support while working toward the realization of more moderate goals.





On December 17 the Prime Minister told the Charge d'Affaires that the Shah had agreed to let Saleh run. It now appears, therefore, that the Shah may have been convinced that he has more to gain by making a dramatic gesture toward freedom in the next elections than he has to lose by allowing Saleh greater latitude of criticism. It is the opinion of the Embassy that the Shah has made the correct decision and would do well to abide by it.

Stuart W. Rockwell
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

cc: All Consulates PDAK
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SECRET

AIRGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

CLASSIFICATION Amembassy TEHRAN CH:290

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

DATE 24 APRIL 61

TO Amembassy TEHRAN

INFO Secstate WASHDC

REF G-190

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| AmEmbassy KARACHI | G-25 | AmConsulate TABRIZ | G-19 |

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SUBJECT: Second Majlis Speech by Alayar SALEH

REFERENCE: Embassy Despatch 492, March 16, 1961.

Alayar SALEH made his second major speech in the Majlis on April 20. The occasion for his remarks was the final debate on the approval of the credentials of Tehran Deputy, Jamal AKHAVI. Saleh earlier had contested Akhavi's right to be seated because of his activities as Chairman of the Tehran Election Supervisory Council during the elections of August 1960. National Front supporters, aware that Saleh was scheduled to speak, gathered in front of the Majlis, waving signs and shouting slogans in favor of Saleh and against the Majlis. A leaflet protesting the Majlis was distributed. When the session began the group numbered about 5-600 people, most apparently students. In addition, there were a number of bystanders. The demonstrators were noisy but orderly.

In his rather colorless speech Saleh said that the Iranian nation is very displeased with the 20th Majlis. He warned of discontent and said that if nothing is done to quiet the situation there is a possibility of undesirable consequences. Majlis deputies, he stated, have the duty to tell the truth, to allow everyone the right to speak as he sees fit, and to try to win the confidence of the people.

He then went on to say why he was opposing Akhavi's credentials. His opposition was based, he said, on two factors: Akhavi's abuse of public trust while he was head of the Tehran supervisory council during the August elections and his part in the "worse" elections held recently. Saleh repeated the National Front version of both elections, stressing that he termed the "atmosphere of force and intimidation," disregard for public opinion, and lack of press freedom which characterized the last elections. As a result, he stated, the students and bazaar people demonstrated in protest, and many of them were arrested. Under such circumstances, how could Akhavi, who ran against [illegible] still had all his deputies in published returns, even have actually received 40,000 votes?

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In conclusion Saleh argued that Akhavi was ineligible under article 12, item 6, of the Constitution, which says that a Majlis candidate must be known for honesty and trustworthiness. If the Majlis approves his credentials, he said, it may rest assured that they are rejected by the nation.

During the speech there was some mild heckling, but Saleh was not subjected to the same level of abuse which was reported during his first speech.

Following the speech, Saleh left the chamber without waiting to hear Akhavi's rebuttal or to participate in the vote which saw Akhavi's credentials approved by a margin of 114 to 1 with 2 abstentions. (Arsalan KHALATBARI cast the sole dissenting vote.)

As Saleh was leaving the Majlis building, the crowd of his supporters, which appeared to have grown in the interim, broke through the restraining police and surrounded him, cheering wildly and pressing flowers on him. Eventually he got into a waiting car and after his departure the police cleared the square. No further incidents were reported.

Saleh's speech and the resulting demonstration were reported widely in the press, with the treatment, of course, varying.

ROCKWELL

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The Ambassador

September 30, 1961

POL: Harry H. Schwartz

The Shah's 28th Mordad Speech and Alayar Saleh

Throughout much of his speech the Shah castigated the Nationalists and spent much time attempting to link policies of [redacted] with those of the Communists.

The specific passage to which the British Ambassador undoubtedly had reference is quoted below:

"It seems funny that today, the very people who were responsible for such conditions have again begun repeating the same old things they were saying then. They seem to have forgotten the recent past and are repeating what certain foreign radios have been saying for years without success. What were these people doing when the national independence was threatened by the Azarbaijan incident?

"Weren't some of their most influential leaders so very friendly with Pishevary (the Communist leader of Azarbaijan) during the Azarbaijan incident? The uprising that took place on the 28th of Mordad (1332) showed that those who hope to sever the ties between the Shah and the people are hoping in vain."

It would not be surprising if Alayar Saleh had interpreted this as applying to him. As to whether the shoe fits or not, I quote from Despatch No. 353 of December 21, 1960 on Alayar Saleh, as follows:

"In March 1945 Saleh forecast accurately the coming Soviet tactic in Azerbaijan. A CAS report quotes him as saying: "The Russians will use the Iranian leaders to set up popularly supported republics in Azerbaijan, Mazanderan and Gilan. Then Russia will say that neither she nor any other country has the right to interfere since these local governments have been formed in keeping with the principles of the Atlantic Charter." Yet a year later, in August of 1946, Saleh allied the Iran Party with the Communist-dominated Tudeh in the coalition cabinet of Ahmad Qavam es-Salteneh. Saleh's idealistic temperament was fair game for the Popular Front line of social reform; and Qavam, moreover, cleverly took advantage of his political naivete in order to buy desperately needed time from the Soviets. Whatever the reason, Saleh's close cooperation with the Tudeh during this period was later used by his nationalist enemies to discredit his post-Mosadeq anti-communist position."

Presumably Saleh is in the best position to know whether the shoe fits but even he, given his mentality and the time that has passed, probably isn't too sure.

POL:HHSchwartz:meb



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Bio. Allahyar SALEH

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

**Participants:** Ali Pasha SALEH, Embassy Local Employee, Political Advisor

Charles H. Rassias, Second Secretary

**Date:** April 24, 1963

**Place:** Mr. Saleh's office in the Embassy

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During a brief conversation Ali Pash made the following statements:

1. His brother Dr. Jahanshah SALEH was going to be the next Chancellor of Tehran University. Although Ali Pasha had advised his brother not to take the post, Dr. Saleh wanted the position and felt he could do a good job. Ali Pasha had warned him that among opposition groups at the University Dr. Saleh was too closely identified with the Shah and therefore he would be exposed to attacks (including violence.) Also, Ali Pasha said that he was told by one of the other contenders for the Chancellor's job (apparently Dr. ADL) that the Shah had called him in and said that although he did not want to interfere in the selection of the new Chancellor he (HIM) personally felt that Dr. Saleh was the best qualified and it would please him to see Saleh elected although the other competitors (e.g. SIASI and ADL) should of course receive some votes. (Ali Pasha was quite emotional about what he considers heavy-handed dictation and interference in the affairs of the University.)

Ali Pasha then mentioned that Dr. Jahanshah Saleh had met with his other brother Allahyar SAHEL in the latter's prison cell a couple of weeks ago and that Allahyar had dramatically appealed to him to intercede with "the powers that be with whom you (Jahanshah) have influence to release the students". Allahyar said that if anyone should be punished it should be him alone. Dr. Jahanshah Saleh then went to see ALAM and his intercession was the decisive one in speeding up the release of the imprisoned students. (Ali Pasha said that the Government has in fact been making efforts to release the students as soon as bureaucratic procedures, such as the determination of fines, could be resolved.

cc: The DCM
Mr. Schwartz
Reading file
Bio files
Chron

POL:CHRassias:eak
4/27/63

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MF Plummer

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

November 16, 1963

SUBJECT: Meeting Between Alayar SALEH and Ali AMINI and Recent Developments in the National Front

PLACE: Mr. Miller's House

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Cyrus QANI, Secretary
The Industrial Mining and Development Bank

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1. On November 14, Cyrus Qani and Feridun MAHDAVY paid a call on Alayar Saleh. Mr. Qani said that Alayar Saleh told them that Ali Amini had called upon him to discuss the current political situation and to sound him (Saleh) out on a possible coalition. Saleh told Qani that Amini and he agreed on all major issues including those of oil and foreign affairs. Saleh said, according to Qani, that the National Front organisation would honor all past foreign commitments, including the oil agreements. Saleh told Amini that he was well aware of the world oil situation and that the National Front would attempt to change the oil agreement only through rational and possible means.

Saleh pointed out to Amini, Qani said, that major elements of the National Front distrusted him for his post actions, but that the National Front would support any genuine national movement, including one led by Ali Amini should he come to power.

2. Qani reported that Saleh had not yet made up his mind as to future National Front tactics nor had he selected a new council of seven or a new executive council. Saleh was still debating whether to establish a completely new executive council composed largely of the more militant younger members of the National Front as had been rumored.

Saleh, according to Qani, was giving serious thought to his successor, being well aware of the need to prepare a new leadership for the National Front to take over in the near future.

Saleh expressed to Qani his anxiety over the University students. Qani said that they had broken away from the leadership of Saleh, stating that

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because there was in fact no guidance from above, the students would have to guide their own affairs. Saleh told Qani that while he was in prison, he had had long sessions with SAVAK and that PAKRAVAN had shown him extensive files on 976 student leaders and a secondary list of over 3,000 students who would be picked up if trouble broke out. Saleh did not want the younger leaders of the National Front put in prison or beaten up needlessly. Qani said further that Saleh stressed that raw courage was not enough in face of the force and clever tactics of the Shah's regime. Saleh, according to Qani, believes that the regimes "innate corruption" will be as great a factor in bringing the National Front to power as is the militant courage of some of its members.

POL:WGMiller/lf
11/19/63

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Mr. Martin F. Herz

April 15, 1964

Joseph P. Lorenz

Developments in the National Front

Nader SALEH told me at lunch yesterday that, with the exception of a certain amount of jockeying for position among the leadership, there was presently little going on in the National Front. Only four seats out of seven on the Executive Committee had been filled, and Alahyar Saleh was presently trying to find suitable people for the other three. He had offered one of the positions to Fereidun MAHDAVI, who had refused it. Although the ostensible reason for Mahdavi's refusal was that he would have been overwhelmed by the conservative leadership, Saleh speculated that the real reason may have been the strong desire of Mahdavi's mother that he become less active in politics. In any case, Alahyar Saleh had actually intended to give Mahdavi substantial authority; now, much as he wanted to bring in new blood, there was no one left in the younger generation who he felt merited being named to the Executive Committee. Another leadership problem, according to Saleh, was that Qolam Hossein SADEQI had definitely stopped participating actively in National Front affairs. While Sadeqi's opinions did not differ greatly from those of Alahyar Saleh, Sadeqi liked to run things himself and was unwilling to submit to party discipline.

Saleh said that he knew of no contacts between the Mansur government and the National Front. He commented that in his opinion a rapprochement was even less likely at present than when the Alam and Amini governments came to power, simply because the present government was more concerned with economic problems than with any liberalization in the political sphere.

Saleh tended to discount the recent letter of Mosadeq to Iranian students abroad. He said that Mosadeq's letter was indeed highly critical of the present moderate policy of the Front, but that Mosadeq had been critical of the leadership for years, and the only effect of his statements had been to give the radical elements of the National Front something to talk about.

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Commenting on the possibility of religious agitation during Moharram, Saleh said that the National Front would under no circumstances cooperate with the clergy should there be disturbances. He said that Alahyar Saleh had decided that since the ultimate aims of the National Front were diametrically opposed to those of the mullahs, the Front would never combine forces with them against the government. Saleh added that while he had been in prison last winter, he had been impressed by the sincere religious fervor of the leaders of the Freedom Movement of Iran, particularly Mehdi BAZARGAN.

These were the only people, he said, who could and did work actively with the mullahs, and if it came to a test, the Freedom Movement would at present undoubtedly have greater support among the common people than the National Front.

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# TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

INCOMING American Embassy TEHRAN

POL_3

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Date: May 2, 1964

REF ID:

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CR

ACTION: SECSTATE, WASHINGTON 999

Embassy A-591

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Saleh has resigned from post as Chairman of Executive Council of National Front, precipitating resignation of all other members of Executive Council. Criticism of Saleh's leadership by Mosadeq believed to be reason for resignation.

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POL - Mr. Daniel O. Newberry May 6, 1964

POL - Joseph P. Lorenz

Further Developments Among the National Front Leadership

Nader SALEH told me at lunch yesterday that his brother, Allahyar SALEH, had definitely retired from active politics. He said that Mosadeq's recent letters had constituted a challenge which, considering the present fragmented state of the Front, Saleh had simply felt himself unable to oppose successfully. The organization of the National Front, he said, was now in complete disarray. Such followers of Saleh as Mehdi AZAR had been the first to resign, while others on the Executive Committee and Central Council were still biding their time. The mechanics of reconstituting the leadership, he added, had already been suggested by Mosadeq; they consisted of selecting two trustworthy men (one of whom, a mullah by the name of ZANJANI, had already been named) who would in turn choose the Executive Committee from among the representatives of various participating political groups.

On the same general subject, Cyrus QANI remarked yesterday that most of the present commotion is the result of personal ambitions rather than any objective analysis of the present political situation. Men like Shahpur BAKHTIAR who had devoted their lives to the National Front could no longer afford to wait for the right time to act, but felt they had to create the opportunities for action themselves.

cc:
Mr. Newberry/rdg file
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5/6/64



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IRAN

Allahyar SALEH

National Front Leader

(1952)

Allahyar Saleh, a founder of the now-defunct Iran Party, is a leader of the opposition National Front (NF). He has become a symbol of Iranian nationalist sentiment, second in popularity only to the retired nationalist leader and former Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosadeq. A former ambassador to the US and eight times a cabinet minister, he commands a greater following than any other active nationalist figure. During 1963, however, the NF suffered a series of setbacks. Saleh's response was to seek for grounds of compromise between the NF and the Government. This policy drew down upon him a heavy criticism from the more militant elements of the NF, culminating in letters to the NF from its venerated but inactive founder, Mohammad Mosadeq, which supported Saleh's critics. In May 1964 Saleh resigned as chairman of the NF Executive Committee, a post he had held since September 1962.

Saleh is a mild-mannered, vacillating man and an unimpressive speaker. His popularity is ascribed to his uncompromising honesty and dedication to principle, his ready availability to his supporters, and his close association with Mosadeq in the past, rather than political skill. Vehemently anti-Communist, he has resisted all efforts by the Tudeh (Communist) Party to ally with the NF. During the January 1963 referendum, Saleh collaborated with the mullahs in opposition to the Shah's six-point reform program, which Saleh believed was misleading and insincere.

Saleh's position in the National Front is somewhat ambiguous. Although he was for many years its most popular leader, he has never controlled it. Originally formed in 1950 under the leadership of Mosadeq, the NF today is a loose confederation of nationalist parties held together by the image of Mosadeq and by their common opposition to the Government. Generally anti-Communist and pro-reform, it is basically a middle class movement, led by university graduates who find their opportunities in present-day Iran limited. During the Mosadeq period Saleh was the leader of the strongest party within the NF, and this fact coupled with the admiration which his honesty, unequalled in Iranian politics, inspires, accounts in large part for his present prestige.

Saleh's political ideas, which he has evolved over his 39 years of political activity, are simple and moderate. He believes that rapid economic progress is Iran's only defense against a revolution of the educated classes. His opposition to Communism is based on a clear perception of Soviet strategy and tactics. Fearing British economic domination almost as much as Soviet political domination, he finds US support a

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Allahyar SALEH (cont.)

necessity in a world where he feels Iran cannot stand alone. He is a supporter of monarchy as an institution, although he resents the Shah's interference in the daily conduct of government. Although neither the Iran Party nor the NF has as yet been proscribed, the activities of both are closely watched by the Government. Saleh and most of the other leading NF figures were imprisoned from January to September 1963 for their anti-referendum campaign.

Saleh was born in 1897 in the region of Kashan, the fourth of eight sons of a prominent local family. He was educated at the American College in Tehran, where he learned to speak fluent English and some French, in addition to his native Farsi. His first job was as interpreter at the US Legation in Tehran. In 1927 he brought his talent for administration to the government and, after holding various posts in the Ministry of Justice, he became director of monopolies in the Ministry of Finance in 1933. Named Director General of the Ministry in 1937, he was sent to Moscow the following year on an economic mission. In 1940 he came to Washington as head of a delegation to negotiate a reciprocal trade agreement. He held his first cabinet post in 1942 as Ahmad Qavam's Minister of Finance, and later the same year became chairman of the Board of Directors of the Mortgage Bank of Iran. In November 1942 he was sent to India as an official commercial representative. In May 1944 he was named Minister of Justice, a post which he retained through a change of government the following May. He represented Iran at the UN founding conference in San Francisco in April 1945, and was described by US officials at that time as thoroughly versed in economic and legal affairs and a good friend of the US.

Saleh served as Minister of State and later Minister of the Interior in Ibrahim Hakimi's second Cabinet (December 1945-February 1946). In the Ahmad Qavam coalition Cabinet of August 1946, Saleh was made Minister of Justice as a result of a temporary alliance between his Iran Party (founded in 1943) and the Tudeh Party. This association has been viewed by his rivals and by the Government as compromising his later anti-Tudeh stand; the inconsistency has been described by others as a result of Anglophobia rather than pro-Soviet sympathies. Elected to the Majlis in 1950, he joined the Mosadeq bloc of deputies, and as chairman of the Joint Oil Commission accompanied Mosadeq to the UN in October 1951 to help defend the nationalization of Iranian oil. He was sent to the US as Ambassador in August 1952.

Following Mosadeq's overthrow in August 1953, Saleh was asked by his lifelong friend Fazlollah Zahedi to remain in his position. He refused, however, declaring that only a Mosadeqist government could survive. This statement won him friends among the nationalists, but put an end to his government career. On his return to Iran, he was prevented from campaigning for the Majlis in his home region of Kashan. In 1956 he went

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Allahyar SALEH (cont.)

on a hunger strike to protest election rigging. He attempted to revive the Iran Party in 1957 with a public statement supporting the Eisenhower Doctrine, but was promptly put down by the Government, and his party was nearly outlawed. His energetic criticism of the 1960 elections helped rouse public opinion, until the Shah was forced to annul the elections and call for new ones. Saleh was permitted to win the Kashan seat. During the short life of the 20th Majlis (March-May 1961), Saleh continued to voice his complaints concerning election procedures and Government policy, but his record in winning support for the NF was unimpressive.

Saleh is a humorless and at times quixotic figure, whose emotional attachment to the nationalist cause makes it often difficult to talk to him. He is married and has two sons and a daughter living; two other children died in 1946. One of his brothers, Jahanshah Saleh, is chancellor of Tehran University; another brother, Ali Pasha Saleh, has long been a consultant at the US Embassy in Tehran.

AB:ljc



26 May 1964

# FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

RATING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

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COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF NATIONAL FRONT /NF/ LEADERS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAN

REPORT NO.

DATE OF REPORT: 4 MAY 1966

NO. PAGES

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO.: MID-APRIL 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ.: IRAN, TEHRAN 27 APRIL 1966

NIT-7100

THESE UNEVALUATED INFORMATION, SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A LAYMAN WHO IS A TRUSTED CONFIDANT OF MANY IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS. HE IS ALSO CLOSE TO POLITICAL OPPOSITION LEADERS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE NATIONAL FRONT AND THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT OF IRAN. ALTHOUGH HE HAS SELDOM REPORTED ON POLITICAL OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES, HIS INFORMATION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN RELIGIOUS CIRCLES HAS USUALLY BEEN ACCURATE. HE HAS FREQUENTLY BEEN CRITICAL OF U.S. POLICIES WHICH SUPPORT THE SHAH. HE ATTENDED THE MEETING REPORTED ON BELOW.

1. ON 24 APRIL 1966 A NUMBER OF FORMER NF LEADERS MET AT THE HOME OF ALLAHYAR SALEH, FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE NF CENTRAL COUNCIL, TO DISCUSS IRAN'S GENERAL POLITICAL SITUATION AND THE STATE OF THE NF. AMONG THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING, WHICH WAS ONE OF A SERIES HELD DURING THE PAST YEAR, WERE GHOLAM HOSSEIN SADEGHI, FORMER MEMBER OF THE NF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, AND ALI ASHRAF MANUCHEHRI NF MEMBER AND FORMER CHIEF OF THE LAND REGISTRATION OFFICE IN THE MOHAMMAD MOSADEQ GOVERNMENT. AFTER REVIEWING LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, THE PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE MAKING PROGRESS IN IRAN AND THAT THERE IS LITTLE THE NF CAN DO TO PREVENT IT. SALEH SAID HE FORESEES THE POSSIBILITY OF A VIETNAM-TYPE SITUATION DEVELOPING IN IRAN AS THE WESTERN POWERS BELATEDLY REACT TO PREVENT COMMUNIST ENCROACHMENT.

2. ACCORDING TO SADEGHI, THE NF'S INACTIVITY HAS LED THE PATRIOTIC YOUNG MEN OF THE COUNTRY TO BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS BOUGHT OFF THE NF LEADERSHIP AND THAT THE ONLY PATH OPEN TO THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT IS TO COOPERATE WITH THE COMMUNISTS. SADEGHI SAID THAT THE TUDEH PARTY'S RADIO PEYK-E IRAN BASED IN BULGARIA HAS BEEN INFLUENTIAL AMONG THE YOUNG PEOPLE AND HAS PERSUADED SOME THAT COOPERATION WITH THE TUDEH IS MANDATORY FOR

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THE NF'S SUCCESS. SADEGHI THEN QUOTED A RELIGIOUS-MINDED YOUNG FRIEND WHO SAID HE LISTENS TO PEYK-E IRAN BECAUSE ONLY THAT RADIO BROADCASTS THE SPEECHES OF EXILED AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH MUSAVI KHOMEINI.

3. SALEH AGREED WITH SADEGHI'S COMMENTS AND SAID THAT UNFORTUNATELY THE NF CAN DO NOTHING AT PRESENT BECAUSE OF THE RELENTLESS PRESSURE FROM THE GOVERNMENT SECURITY SERVICES. IN A SENSE, HOWEVER, THE SHAH'S REFORM PROGRAM IS DOING THE NF'S WORK FOR IT, SAID SALEH, BY AWAKENING THE PEOPLE IN EVEN THE REMOTEST IRANIAN VILLAGES. THIS NEW POLITICAL AWARENESS WILL WORK TO THE REGIME'S DISADVANTAGE, HE CONTINUED, BUT THE COMMUNISTS, NOT THE NF, MIGHT BE THE FIRST TO EXPLOIT THE RESULTING POLITICAL TURMOIL.

4. /FIELD COMMENT - ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE'S ACCOUNT, THE GROUP DEVOTED THE REST OF THE DISCUSSION TO THE USUAL NF CRITICISMS OF THE U.S. AND OF THE SHAH. THEY ATTACKED THE U.S. FOR ITS SUPPORT OF THE SHAH, FOR ITS VANITY IN PROPPING UP PUPPET DICTATORS WHO SACRIFICE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE, AND FOR ITS ARROGANCE IN REFUSING TO ACKNOWLEDGE A WRONG POLICY SUCH AS THAT IN VIETNAM. THE GROUP CRITICIZED THE SHAH FOR HIS HYPOCRITICAL APPROACH TO ISLAMIC UNITY AND FOR HIS BLINDNESS IN FAILING TO SEE THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE IN IRAN WILL UNDERMINE HIS REGIME TO THE EXTENT THAT THE U.S. WILL BE FORCED TO INTERVENE MILITARILY AND ANOTHER VIETNAM SITUATION WILL DEVELOP IN IRAN./

/END/



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*Memorandum*

TO : Chief, Political Section

DATE: 6 December 1966
P-214/66

FROM : CAS

SUBJECT: Recent Anti-American Statements of Allahyar Saleh

The following is for your information and whatever use you wish to make of it within the security limitations designated. Any reporting by you of this information must cite the control NOFORN but need not cite CAS as the source.

(Comment: Allahyar Saleh was recently heard to make the following comments.)

1. Unfortunately, the situation is disappointing. One can no longer place any hopes in the Americans because they, too, are following the British in the policy of colonialism. There is one difference, however -- the British were flexible, but the Americans are a symbol of harshness.

2. It is possible for the British to come to terms with people and to cooperate with them, but it has become obvious now that the Americans insist on working with infamous elements, oppressors or men endowed with oppressive qualities, and that they support only those elements who enjoy the dislike and hatred of their society. Anyone with a good reputation or one who is bound to observe human principles will not place any value whatsoever in the Americans' policy.

3. The people believe that everything is in the Americans' hands, that everything emanates from them, and that they could make all kinds of adjustments if they should decide and want to, but, unfortunately, they are not convinced they should adopt a policy of moderation and take a middle-course of peaceful adjustment. Unfortunately whoever refuses to cooperate with the Americans is accused of collaborating with the communists.

4. All the breathing-and peep-holes have been plugged in this country, and one must sit and wait for forthcoming developments. During my stay in the United States, I was fascinated by its people, statesmen and people endowed with high humanitarian principles, but later it became evident that the colonial policy of the United States is different from American training and

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American civilization, just as the colonial policy of Britain differs from British civilization and training.

5. Nothing, however, can be accomplished without their advance approval. Therefore one must not cherish any hopes in them. I, too, have become a supporter of the opinion of the clergymen--hope in God and in forthcoming developments.



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